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Abstract
We report on an experiment examining why default options impact behavior. By
randomly assigning employees to different varieties of a salary-linked savings account,
we find that default enrollment increases participation by 40 percentage points—an
effect equivalent to providing a 50% matching incentive. We then use a series of
experimental interventions to differentiate between explanations for the default effect,
which we conclude is driven largely by present-biased preferences and the cognitive
cost of thinking through different savings scenarios. Default assignment also changes
employees’ attitudes toward saving, and makes them more likely to actively decide to
save after the study concludes.
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1 Introduction
Default assignments impact behavior. This observation is among the most influential and
policy relevant insights from behavioral economics (Madrian, 2014). From organ donation
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006) and vaccine use (Chapman et al.,
2010) to exercise (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006) and marketing (Johnson et al., 2002),
and especially in the domain of retirement savings decisions (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi
et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2014; Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988), individuals tend to remain at their default assignment. Yet, particularly
as relates to retirement savings, economists still have an incomplete understanding of why
defaults work.
This paper reports results from a field experiment in Afghanistan designed to identify
the reasons why defaults affect behavior. We have several reasons for studying defaults in
Afghanistan. First, most of the existing evidence on default savings is from rich countries.1
Less is known about the potential for defaults to affect savings in poor countries, where most
of the world’s population resides and where the economic benefits of increasing savings may
be higher. Related, in developed countries, it is frequently the poorest and least financially
sophisticated who respond most strongly to defaults (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et
al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010a); this suggests defaults might be particularly effective in
poor countries. Finally, while the lack of financial infrastructure has historically limited
the relevance of default savings products in poor countries, the recent proliferation of mobile
money, which already has more than half a billion registered accounts worldwide, promises to
provide billions of “unbanked” individuals with a financial infrastructure that could support
the use of defaults (GSMA, 2017).
We therefore worked with Afghanistan’s largest mobile phone operator to design and
experimentally evaluate a new phone-based default savings account, called “M-Pasandaz.”2
The study took part in two phases. In the first, each of 949 employees was randomly assigned
to have either 0% or 5% of his or her salary automatically directed into a savings account.
Separately, each employee was randomly assigned a financial incentive to save, with one
third of employees receiving a 50% match on all contributions; one third receiving a 25%
match; and the final third receiving no match. This phase makes it possible to compare the
effect of ‘nudging’ employees with defaults and of incentivizing them with matches, and to
experimentally estimate how defaults affect employee decisions and savings. In the second
1Reviewing the literature, we count six studies on automatic enrollment in savings programs in the U.S.,
along with one in Denmark, one in Australia, and one in Chile. Empirical evidence of default effects on other
behaviors is similarly concentrated in rich countries (see a summary of studies in Appendix Table A1).
2“Pasandaz” means savings in Dari, the most common language spoken in Afghanistan.
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phase of the study, we implemented a series of interventions designed to unstick employees
from their default assignment and experimentally test several prominent explanations for
default effects.
The first phase of the study produces three basic results. First, default assignments
have large and significant impacts on employee participation and savings, of comparable
magnitude to what is reported in the literature on defaults in developed countries (Appendix
Table A1). Two months after the launch of the product and after almost all switching of
contribution rates had ceased, employees randomly assigned a default contribution rate of 5
percent were 40 percentage points more likely to contribute to the account than individuals
assigned a default contribution rate of zero. We collected several rounds of follow-up surveys
with each employee, and while the data are too imprecise to draw firm conclusions, we find
no evidence that M-Pasandaz crowded out other savings.
Second, we “price” the default relative to matching contributions, and estimate the elas-
ticity of participation with respect to the match rate. While prior research examines the
effect of matching incentives on savings (Duflo et al., 2006; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2007),
and more recent work indicates that savings programs incorporating default contributions
are more likely to increase participation than monetary incentives alone (Chetty et al., 2014;
Madrian, 2013), to our knowledge this is the first study to experimentally compare default
and incentive effects on the same population for a single product. We find that default as-
signment increases participation by roughly the same amount as a 50% match on employee
contributions. We further find that the elasticity of participation with respect to the match
rate is about one, independent of default status.
Third, we find that defaults affect employee attitudes and interest in saving, even long
after the experiment concludes. Most notably, we removed all financial incentives to con-
tribute at the end of a six-month trial, and asked each employee to make an active decision
about whether to continue contributing. Even absent incentives, 45% of employees elected
to contribute, with participation 25% higher in the group that was randomly assigned a
positive default contribution rate at the beginning of the trial. Employees defaulted into
savings reported significantly higher levels of financial security, and two years later, their
savings balances remained larger than those randomly defaulted out of savings during the
trial. Such evidence is consistent with the idea that employees might form habits through
the experience of saving (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Charness and Gneezy, 2009), perhaps
through better financial planning (Thaler, 1999; Schaner, 2016). More broadly, these results
can inform the larger discussion of whether using defaults to change financial behavior is
welfare improving by suggesting that automatic enrollment can cause employees to learn
about the costs and benefits of saving (Bernheim et al., 2015).
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The rest of the paper explores why default assignments impact savings. Here, we at-
tempt to differentiate between five explanations offered by the literature; the first three are
consistent with rational models, and the latter two with behavioral models. First, defaults
may persist because of an employer ‘endorsement’ effect whereby decision-makers, unsure of
the best course of action, take the default as reflecting a recommendation by a benevolent
planner (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2004; Madrian, 2014). Second, there may be
significant real or perceived costs involved in switching from the default election, due to me-
chanical frictions in changing one’s contribution rate. Third, and closely related, there may
be a large mental cost associated with the complexity of forming a financial plan (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2011; Cole et al., 2011; Drexler et al., 2014). Fourth, turning to behavioral
theories, employees may be unaware of their election, or the possibility of switching may
not be salient in their minds (Karlan et al., 2016b; Taubinsky, 2013; Kast et al., 2016).
Finally, because changing defaults involves some immediate costs with delayed benefits, in-
dividuals may not switch, particularly if they are present-biased and naive about their future
preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
Our data do not support the first two explanations for why defaults affect behavior. First,
our research design eliminates employer ‘endorsement’ effects by construction: the open
lottery used to assign default status and matching incentives makes clear to employees that
assignments do not reflect the deliberation of a benevolent planner, and this understanding
is clearly visible in follow-up surveys with employees.3 We also see little evidence that the
“default in” assigned rate of 5% was perceived as optimal – only 6 of 472 employees (1.3%)
actively chose to contribute at 5% (most people who opted in did so at the maximum of
10%). Second, every effort was made to minimize the mechanical cost of switching. For
instance, to change their contribution rate, employees simply needed to let someone from
their human resources department know – this could be done in person, via a phone call, or
by sending an email or text message. Our survey data indicate that employees were clearly
aware of their contribution level and knew how to change it if they wanted to.4
Similarly, we find that large default effects persist after deploying a series of interventions
designed to increase the salience of default assignment. These include randomly assigned
text messages as well as randomly assigned financial surveys, neither of which resulted in
significant switching. The strongest evidence we can find of inattention occurred three weeks
into the study on the first payday, when 22 of our 943 participants (2.33%) switched their
3In the endline survey, for instance, 75% of the 816 respondents confirmed their belief that the assignment
of matching incentives was random, while 14% indicated they did not think it was truly random, and 11%
indicated that they were unsure.
4For instance, 87% of employees report fully understanding how the product works, and 96% of partici-
pants were aware of their match rate.
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contribution, which was a modest increase over the number of switches on previous days.
Thus, while limited attention clearly affects savings decisions in other contexts and plays a
small role here, it is unlikely to explain the default effects observed in our context.
By contrast, there is much in our data to suggest that default effects in savings persist
because employees face significant cognitive costs associated with identifying their optimal
contribution rate, and that this cost, together with present-biased preferences, creates pro-
crastination. We elicited several measures of present bias—including hypothetical and in-
centivized behavioral elicitations, as well as through a real-world task over which employees
could procrastinate—and find that present-biased employees were significantly more likely to
remain at their default assignment (even controlling for their long run discount factor and a
broad set of observables). Further, of the experimental interventions we implemented—all of
which were designed to encourage employees to choose a non-default contribution rate—the
only one that proved effective was to offer employees a thorough financial consultation de-
signed to reduce the cognitive cost of designing a financial plan. This consultation consisted
of several modules, and the component that stands out as most associated with switching
is one that helped employees calculate how much money they would save under different
contribution scenarios.
To summarize, this paper makes several contributions relative to existing research on the
impact of default assignment on savings behaviors. First, we provide the first experimental
evaluation of a default payroll contribution account, and show that experimental estimates
of the default effect in a developing country are comparable to estimates from the U.S. and
western Europe. Afghanistan differs profoundly from most of the countries where defaults
have been researched. Forty years of civil war have left the country as one of the world’s
poorest and most unstable.5 Distrust of financial institutions is high, and only 4% of the
population saves with a bank (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). There are no income tax con-
siderations related to our product and no asset mixes to choose between. The similarity of
our results to those in developed countries provide additional evidence that default savings
effects are a very general phenomena.6
Second, our controlled environment makes it possible to investigate outstanding questions
about default effects, including the ‘price’ of the default relative to financial incentives and
5According to the 2016 World Development Indicators, Afghanistan has a per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted)
of $1,877, ranking 156 out of 175 countries. According to Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption
Perceptions Index, Afghanistan ranks 169 out of 176.
6However, two important caveats are in order. First, we experimentally evaluate a six month commitment
product and not a retirement fund. Second, our sample is not representative of the larger Afghan population:
these employees are all salaried and tend to be wealthier (nominal GDP per capita in Afghanistan is around
$600 USD while the median annual salary in our firm is $5,415.60 USD). However, even amongst the poorer
employees in our sample, who are more comparable to the broader population, we find clear default effects.
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the impact of defaults on savings attitudes future savings decisions. Our design also allows
exploration of the mechanisms underlying the default, which together highlight the cognitive
cost of deciding how much to save and the role of present-bias in the persistence of default
effects. Here, our paper relates most closely to several recent studies showing that whether
someone remains in a default assignment is predicted by measures of procrastination (Brown
and Previtero, 2014; Brown et al., 2016; Goda et al., 2015). Relative to these efforts, our
study benefits from experimental variation in default assignment, as well as a series of cross-
randomized interventions designed to compare present bias to other common explanations
for default effects.
A key feature of M-Pasandaz is that default salary contributions are passive. Once en-
rolled, contributions are automatic and do not require any action from the saver (Chetty et
al., 2014). This may be particularly important in developing countries where many of the pri-
mary obstacles to saving, from simple transactions costs associated with traveling to the bank
(Burgess and Pande, 2005; Callen et al., 2017), to intra-household disagreements regarding
savings (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Ashraf, 2009; Schaner, 2015), behavioral issues of dy-
namic inconsistency (Ashraf et al., 2006; Karlan et al., 2016b; Dupas and Robinson, 2013),
temptation good (including drug and alcohol) consumption (Banerjee and Mullainathan,
2010; Schilbach, 2017), and ego depletion (Shah et al., 2012), all relate to the fact that sav-
ings must first pass through the saver’s hands, who must then make an active decision to
save (Karlan et al., 2014; Madrian, 2013).
We are optimistic that these insights can create new options for improving the savings
prospects of many people historically left out of formal financial ecosystems. For while very
few Afghans save with a bank, 90% have access to a mobile phone, and a growing share use
mobile money. This is emblematic of a global pattern: only 22% of adults in developing
countries report saving in formal accounts (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015), and in sub-Saharan
Africa, the number of mobile money accounts has already surpassed bank accounts (GSMA,
2017). In concert, the International Labor Organization estimates that the share of the
developing world’s households in the middle class or above more than doubled from 1991
to 2011, and was projected to pass 50% in 2017, with over 60% of these workers in wage
employment (Kapsos and Bourmpoula, 2013).7 As the share of wage earners in developing
countries increases, and as electronic payment systems become more common, products like
M-Pasandaz can provide new options for mobilizing savings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Afghan
7Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) report that 400 million unbanked adults receive wages or government
transfers in cash. The payment of salaries via mobile money is now happening in South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America (cf. Karlan et al., 2016a; Aker et al., 2016; Breza et al., 2017); phone-based and
electronic welfare payments are also becoming increasingly common (Muralidharan et al., 2016).
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context. Section 3 describes the M-Pasandaz product and the experimental design to evaluate
its effect on savings. Section 4 reports the impact of default enrollment and Section 5
discusses the potential role of present-biased preferences in creating a default effect and
considers alternative explanations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Financial Inclusion in Afghanistan
After four decades of political instability and conflict, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest
countries in the world. The formal financial sector is small, with only 2.3 banks per 100,000
adults, and only 4% of adults reporting any formal savings over the past year (International
Monetary Fund, 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015).8 Yet a demand for savings exists, as
roughly 25% of Afghans report saving in the previous year, primarily through cash or in-kind
holdings (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015; Chipchase et al., 2013). Among our study population,
many respondents report keeping U.S. dollars rather than Afghanis, the local currency, and
when making long-distance transfers forego wire services in favor of hawalas, a trust-based
network of money brokers. While saving money to buy a house or a car seems out of reach for
most, saving money in case of death or illness is essential. They often store their money in a
metal box at home (a traditional method), or with a trustworthy (often wealthier) relative.
They tell stories of themselves or people they know going hungry or reducing food quality
after a shock of some kind, and describe the shame of young men unable to marry for lack
of money.
While bank presence is limited, mobile phones are prevalent throughout the country, with
approximately 75 mobile cellular subscriptions for every 100 Afghan adults (International
Telecommunication Union, 2015). More recently, several operators in Afghanistan launched
“mobile money” platforms, which deliver rudimentary financial services to subscribers over
the mobile phone network. We focus on one such mobile money platform, “M-Paisa,” which
was launched in 2008 by Roshan Telecom, and which, at the time of our study, was the
nation’s largest mobile money network with 1.2 million unique subscribers. In Afghanistan,
as in other countries, mobile money uses SMS-like functionality to enable the exchange and
storage of value over a basic mobile phone interface, complemented by a real-world network
of agents providing “cash-in” deposit and “cash-out” withdrawal services. As mobile phone
penetration rates surge in developing countries, mobile money has emerged as a possible
financial instrument for the poor, and there are now more than 500 million registered ac-
8Afghan banks offer short-term savings accounts with a floating interest rate and long-term “fixed deposit”
accounts with a fixed interest and term, though the reported rates often fall below the annual inflation rate,
which ranges between 5% and 10%.
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counts using 277 mobile money services in 92 countries, with 118 million accounts active
in December of 2016 (GSMA, 2017). These accounts have historically been used primarily
for interpersonal transfers (Jack and Suri, 2014; Blumenstock et al., 2016), and in Kenya,
the country where mobile money is most widespread, have led to considerable reductions in
poverty (Suri and Jack, 2016). More recently, however, many mobile operators have begun
to offer more sophisticated financial services, including interest-bearing savings accounts,
insurance, and credit products.9
3 “Mobile-izing” Savings with M-Pasandaz
We worked with Roshan, Afghanistan’s largest mobile network operator, to develop a new
product for the M-Paisa mobile money system, called “M-Pasandaz.” M-Pasandaz facilitates
automatic payroll deductions and employer matching contributions using mobile money.10
Specifically, a Roshan subscriber who owns a mobile money (M-Paisa) account and is paid via
mobile money can enable a parallel mobile M-Pasandaz wallet and select to have a portion
of her salary automatically deducted into this wallet during each pay cycle. Consistent
with Islamic principles, these contributions do not earn interest, but employers may provide
matching incentives.11
Through our study, we provided different versions of the M-Pasandaz account to all
eligible Roshan employees. Our study population consists of 949 full-time Afghan national
employees of Roshan, about 15% of whom are women (Appendix Table A2).12 Employees
hold job titles such as Manager, Engineer, Security Guard and Janitor and are located in six
major regional offices: Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar, Herat, Ghazni and Kunduz. Prior to the
launch of M-Pasandaz, all of these employees were being paid with M-Paisa direct deposits;
9See Aker and Blumenstock (2014) for a review of recent literature, and GSMA (2017) for a comprehensive
report on mobile money in developing countries.
10Prior to our collaboration, Roshan had for a number of years aspired to create a defined contribution
program for their employees. Automatic payroll deductions are widely used to promote savings in developed
countries (Beshears et al., 2009). There are also examples of automatic payroll deductions for savings in
developing countries, such as publicly-mandated pension (or “provident”) funds for private sector workers
in India, Malaysia and elsewhere. While Afghanistan does not currently mandate pension plans for private
sector employers, several of the larger employers, including telecoms and international NGOs, voluntarily offer
such programs. During the study, several private pension and savings schemes were active in Afghanistan,
permitting employee contribution rates between 5-10% of monthly salaries with employer matches of up to
100% of deposits and vesting periods ranging from monthly to annual.
1124 employees (2.5%) described the product as un-Islamic when explaining why they did not to participate.
12At the time of our baseline survey in June 2014, Roshan had roughly 1,100 employees, of whom roughly
90% were Afghan national staff paid using mobile money. We exclude from our sample a group of 18
employees who participated in qualitative focus groups and pilot product development, as well as those
employees who had left Roshan prior to the launch of M-Pasandaz in January 2015, leaving us with an
experimental sample of 949 employees.
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that is, each month their monthly wages are deposited into their normal M-Paisa mobile
money account.13 The average tenure in our sample was 5.8 years, and all of Roshan’s
Afghan employees had received mobile salary payments since 2010, so this population was
familiar with the mobile money system.
Several aspects of the M-Pasandaz account werse held constant across all employees. Most
relevant to our design, deposits into M-Pasandaz could only be made via direct deposit at the
time of the regular monthly salary payment; there was no other way to transfer funds into the
M-Pasandaz account. Each pay cycle, regardless of the amount contributed by the employee
to M-Pasandaz, the employee would receive an SMS confirmation indicating how much had
been paid via direct deposit and how much had been placed in the employee’s M-Pasandaz
account. Employees were free to check the balance on their accounts and to electronically
withdraw money at any time; this was done to enable access to liquidity in times of urgent
need. However, any withdrawal made during the initial six-month commitment period would
forfeit that employee’s eligibility for matching incentive payments and eliminate the accrued
matches from their employer.14 All employees were required to attend a 60-minute training
session, during which a representative from Roshan Human Resources described M-Pasandaz
as a “new benefit offered by Roshan” and explained the details of the account.
Two key features of M-Pasandaz account were randomized between employees. First,
employees were randomly assigned a default contribution rate. For half of employees, the
default contribution was set to 5% of their monthly salary; for the other half, the default
contribution was set to 0%. To simplify the later exposition, we will occassionally refer to
the 5% group as the “default in” group, and the 0% group as the “default out” group. Note,
however, that all employees were given an account and enrolled, the difference between groups
was simply their default-assigned contribution rate, which all employees had the option to
change at any time.
Subjects were also randomly assigned to one of three different levels of matching incentive
for M-Pasandaz contributions, creating a 2 x 3 design. The employer characterized these
as three different M-Pasandaz “plans” that are distinguished only by the level of matching
incentives: White (0% match), Blue (25% match) and Red (50% match).15 Thus, for each
13While there is a withdrawal fee for “cashing out” of the mobile money system, each mobile salary
payment includes the cost of one withdrawal to ensure the entire salary was transfered. See Blumenstock et
al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the extant mobile salary payment technology in Afghanistan.
14The M-Pasandaz account was similar to a commitment savings account in that withdrawals prior to the
six-month deadline forfeited a potential incentive payment, but had key differences in that default enrollment
was linked to salary payments and participants could recover their own contributions at any time without
penalty.
15These incentive levels are similar to those in prior literature from developed country (Duflo et al., 2006)
and developing country settings (Carter et al., 2015), and were consistent with savings incentives provided
by Roshan’s competitors in Afghanistan.
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monthly deposit to M-Pasandaz made by the employee, the employer would make a corre-
sponding deposit at the level specified by the employee’s plan. Employees were informed
that these matching incentives would be available at the end of the six-month commitment
period, but that all accrued incentives would be lost if a withdrawal was made before then.
As opposed to the contribution rate, which the employee could change easily, the employee
could not change his or her matching incentive. Finally, Roshan paid taxes in advance on
the matching incentives, so employees received the exact amount specified by their plan.
Employees were informed of both their matching incentive and their default contribution
rate at the end of the HR training session through a personalized card that was distributed
by the HR representative. During training, employees were informed that they could change
their contribution rate at any time by calling or visiting the HR department, and this contact
number was included on the personalized card; the goal was to minimize the friction involved
in switching contribution rates. Employees were free to set their contribution rate to any
value between 0% and 10% of their monthly salary. Importantly, this created scope for the
default in group to either increase or decrease their contribution, while the default out group
could only increase their contribution. Any change in the contribution rate was instantaneous
and applied to all future salary payments, with the caveat that each month’s contribution was
locked in on the 15th of the month to give HR sufficient time to prepare monthly payments,
which typically occurred on the 20th of the month.
Both treatments were stratified by employee salary terciles, self-reported perceptions
of physical insecurity, and provincial office locations, using data collected in a face-to-face
baseline survey of all employees in May and June 2014. We used a “big stick” approach to
randomization to ensure that no key characteristics were imbalanced with a p-value of less
than 0.1 (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009).16 Appendix Table A2 reports balance tests on a range
of observable characteristics across all six resulting combinations of the primary treatments.
In December 2014, employees attended the HR training session and were informed of their
default contribution rate and plan assignments. An “open enrollment” period during which
employees could change their contribution rate began on December 30, 2014 and lasted until
January 15, 2015, and the first automatic contributions were made on January 21, 2015. The
sixth and final automatic contribution occurred on June 21, 2015, and incentive payments
were distributed on July 23, 2015. Over the study period, we conducted four phone-based
follow-up survey waves with a randomly selected panel of half the employees. In August
2015 we conducted a final face-to-face endline survey with all employees participating in the
16In applying the ‘big stick’ we checked for balance on salary, total savings, and a dummy variables for: (i)
regularly using a bank; (ii) being confident in paying monthly bills; (iii) expecting violence; (iv) not being
satisfied with mobile salary payments; and (v) withdrawing the entire paycheck on payday.
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study.
4 The Default Effect
4.1 The Default Effect on Participation and Contributions
During the six-month study window, 459 of the 949 employees (48.3%) elected to change
their contribution rate from their default assignment; the remaining 490 employees remained
at the default. As shown in Figure 1, most of the employees who switched did so in the first
three weeks of the study. Employees who switched came from all plan types (Appendix
Figure A1) and cited a variety of reasons for doing so (Appendix Table A3). While many
employees did change their contribution rate, the effect of the default is evident in the large
number of employees who never moved from their default (Figure 2). For instance, 39% of
employees who were assigned a default rate of 0% in the Red plan—all of whom would have
received significant financial incentives to save—left “cash on the table” by continuing to
contribute 0% of their salary to M-Pasandaz. Similarly, 36% of the employees in the White
plan who were assigned a default rate of 5% continued to contribute 5% of their salary to
M-Pasandaz, even though they received no financial incentives to do so.17
We estimate the causal effect of defaults in Table 1.18 Employees who are “defaulted
in” at 5% are 40 percentage points more likely to contribute to the account than employees
defaulted to 0% (Panel A, column 1).19 Similarly, random assignment to a 5% contribution
increases 6-month contribution rates by 1.77 percentage points (Panel B, column 1), equiv-
alent to a 66% increase over the control group’s average contribution rate of 2.7%.20 Thus,
the net effect of default enrollment was to increase monthly employee contributions by 2,426
Afghanis ($40 USD, Panel C), roughly 10% of the median monthly wage.
The magnitude of the default effects we observe are remarkably consistent with previous
non-experimental estimates of the default effect in developed countries (Appendix Table A1).
17These percentages reflect behavior after two months, and prior to the launch of several randomized
follow-up interventions designed to nudge employees from their default assignment. Behavior over other
relevant periods is presented in Table 4.
18Because we are interested in interpreting the constant terms in the regressions, Tables 1-4 do not include
stratum fixed effects; the versions including stratum fixed effects are provided in Appendix Tables B1 - B4.
19In Appendix Table A4, when participation is defined as making a non-zero contribution and never making
a withdrawal, defaulting enrollment increases participation by 31 percentage points. In Appendix Table A5,
we find qualitatively similar effects for particiption and contribution rate using the values of these variables
at the end of the study on July 15th instead of February 28th.
20Whereas the effect on participation is present for all levels of matching incentives (Panel B, columns 1-3),
the effect on contribution rates is only present in the White (0% matching contributions) and Blue (25%
matching contributions) plans (Panel B, columns 2-4), suggesting that the strongest financial incentives may
have been sufficient to overcome the default effect.
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And while the employees we study are not representative of the broader Afghan population,
they do exhibit considerable heterogeneity in income and other sociodemographic character-
istics (Appendix Table A2). In our sample, we find that the magnitude of the default effect
is remarkably consistent across salary quartiles (Appendix Table A6).
We were naturally interested in understanding whether the increase in M-Pasandaz sav-
ings represents a net increase in total savings, or whether employees are instead substituting
out of other financial instruments, as has been the case in several studies in the U.S. and
Western Europe.21 We thus conducted a series of longitudinal follow-up surveys to ask em-
ployees about their financial behaviors. Unfortunately, the limited size of our sample, along
with the imprecision of the data captured in the recall survey, do not allow us to draw any
firm conclusions about whether the increase in M-Pasandaz affected other types of savings.
These effects are discussed in greater detail in Appendix Section A, and summarized in Ap-
pendix Table A7. In sum, we do not see evidence that the default contributions crowded
out other types of saving, or reduced food expenditures (a potential concern for the poorer
workers in our sample), but we also see no sign of increased net savings for the average
employee.
4.2 Comparing the Default Effect to Matching Incentives
Employees also responded strongly to the matching incentives provided by the employer. As
can be inferred from the constant terms in columns 2-4 of Table 1 (Panel A), among employees
initially assigned a contribution rate of 0%, the participation rate was 1% for employees with
no matching contributions, 27% for employees with 25% matching contributions, and 57%
for employees with 50% matching contributions.
Our design enables us to directly compare the default effect to the effect of matching
incentives. Figure 3 relates the default effect to the effect of matching incentives, using
the coefficients estimated in Table 1. At all levels of matching incentives, participation and
contribution rates are higher for the group of employees with a 5% default than for those
with a 0% default, and for both groups the elasticity of participation with respect to the
employer match rate is approximately one.
These results can inform the broader debate regarding the effectiveness of behavioral
nudges relative to traditional incentives (cf. Chetty et al., 2014). In our context, the employer
would need to match employee contributions at 50% to achieve the same participation rate
21Prominent examples include Benjamin (2003), Chetty et al. (2013), and Beshears et al. (2017). We are
not aware of prior work on automatic contribution programs in developing countries. The closest examples
are Brune et al. (2017) and Somville and Vandewalle (2017), who study “default” effects by experimentally
manipulating whether beneficiaries are paid in cash or to a bank account. In both studies, benficiaries paid
via bank transfer save more than those paid in cash.
12
as from merely having employees contribute by default. More concretely, we can calculate
the implicit value of the nudge to the employer in forgone matching incentives: At the end
of the six month pilot, the 159 employees in the 50% match plan who were defaulted out
received a total payout of 699,323 AFA ($13,986.46 USD). If the employer instead only gave
all employees a 50% match and defaulted them in at 0%, Roshan would need to provide
$83,479 USD (or $87.97 USD per employee) in incentives to achieve the same participation
rate as from only defaulting employees in at 5% with a 0% matching incentive.22
4.3 Active Decision and Long-Run Effects
Employees who were randomly induced to save more through our interventions also developed
an interest in saving that persisted after the termination of the experiment. Most notably,
at the conclusion of the 6-month study period, all financial incentives were removed, and
employees were individually asked whether they would like to have a portion of their future
salary automatically deposited into their M-Pasandaz account. We required each employee
to make this decision actively, and the decision was the same for all employees independent
of their treatment status during the main experiment. As shown in Table 2, the desire
to continue contributing was significantly higher for the employees who were exogenously
induced to contribute more through a positive default-assigned contribution rate, particularly
in the 0% matching rate group.23 Overall, employees defaulted in to participating during
the experiment were 10 percentage points (25%) more likely to actively decide to continue
to contribute a portion of their salary to M-Pasandaz. We find that matching incentives had
similar effects.
Using Roshan’s administrative data, which spans one and a half years after experiment,
we can also examine how long default effects persist after matching incentives were removed.24
Figure 4 shows M-Pasandaz participation rates and balances, separately by default status, for
the six months of our study as well as the following 18 months. As discussed above, savings
increased substantially during the study period, and differentially for employees defaulted in.
Participation dropped steeply once financial incentives were removed, but many employees
22To generate an equivalent average contribution, rather than an equivalent degree of participation, requires
a 25% matching incentive. To see this, in Panel B of Table 1, defaults increase the average contribution
in the 0% match group by 2.38 percentage points, which is roughly the average contribution of the group
defaulted out with a 25% matching contribution.
23This, in itself, does not necessarily signal habit formation in the sense of Becker and Murphy (1988).
Increased interest in the product may just be, for example, that employees have learned more about how
much they can comfortably save each month. Hussam et al. (2017) provides a direct experimental test for
rational addiction.
24Charness and Gneezy (2009), Schaner (2016), and Hussam et al. (2017) provide other examples of how
short-run incentives can affect behavior even after incentives are removed.
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continued to contribute, particularly among those randomly assigned to a 5% default. These
results are tabulated and disaggregated by matching incentive in Appendix Table A10.
4.4 Why Did Enthusiasm for M-Pasandaz Increase?
Why were employees initially defaulted in to savings more likely to later make an active deci-
sion to save, and to continue to contribute long after financial incentives were removed? Our
survey data indicate that part of the explanation is that the experience of saving changed
employee perceptions. Employees defaulted in to savings during the experiment were less
likely to report feeling too financially constrained to save, more likely to feel that savings
is important, and more likely to feel confident in meeting their financial obligations. These
results are presented in Table 3, where column 1 indicates the average response among em-
ployees assigned a default contribution rate of 0%, and column 2 indicates the increase in
response for employees assigned a default contribution rate of 5%. Since this table includes
several outcomes that were not a part of our pre-analysis plan, we focus on three summary
indices in Panel A (importance of saving, financial security, and general well-being), and
report a set of p-values that asymptotically control the Family Wise Error Rate (the prob-
ability that any true null is rejected) at 0.05.25 Panels B-D report the individual survey
questions from which the indices are constructed. Appendix Table A12 reports the effects
of randomly assigned matching rates on financial perceptions.
The impact of the default on financial perceptions can be seen in the first two rows of
Table 3, Panel A. Default enrollment increased a composite index of the perceived importance
of saving by 0.14 standard deviations and a summary measure of perceived financial security
by 0.11 standard deviations. Results for each of the survey outcomes that comprise the two
composite indices are reported in Panels B and C. Most notably, defaulting employees in
substantially raised the share of employees who believed that they were not too financially
constrained to save. This might reflect the relaxation of a real constraint, where participation
in M-Pasandaz moved employees beyond some minimum threshold of savings to begin to feel
comfortable saving every month, or might reflect a realization that their prior perception that
they were too constrained to save was inaccurate.26 This seems reasonable in the context
of a six-month pilot that meaningfully affected short-run finances, but which ended before
25This practice follows a growing literature on addressing potential Type I error arising from multiple
hypothesis testing in experiments (Casey et al., 2012; Bidwell et al., 2016). Romano (2010) provides a
review. List et al. (2016) describe a technique that simultaneously controls for several sources of Type I
error in field experiments. We control the Family Wise Error Rate for consumption and the three summary
indices and then for all of the variables that comprise the indices separately.
26In Appendix Table A11, we find the results on the importance of savings are driven primarily by the 0%
matching rate group, consistent with updating prior beliefs about their ability to save without incentives.
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more sustained impact could be realized. Modest but significant default effects are likewise
observed in employees’ attempts to save each month, and in their sense that the M-Pasandaz
program itself changed their desire to save. In Panels D and E, we examine a broader set of
measures of well-being. In general, we do not find evidence that the M-Pasandaz program
impacted measures of food security, happiness, or employment outcomes.
Collectively, these data indicate that the M-Pasandaz program—and default assignment
in particular—significantly increased enthusiasm for saving during the 6-month trial, in part
by helping employees change their beliefs about how much they could feasibly save. More
broadly, these results suggest that use of the product caused employees’ savings behaviors
to become more consistent with their own stated long-run preferences. Indeed, prior to the
study, participants expressed a strong sense that savings was important to them, but that
they simply did not have enough money to save.27 This is broadly consistent with evidence
in more familiar contexts. For instance, Choi et al. (2004) find that many employees report
wanting to save more, suggesting that defaults might help them overcome a behavioral issue
that is impeding their savings goals.And to the extent that policy makers privilege welfare
determined using ex ante preferences (Bernheim et al., 2015), these results suggest that the
inducement to save was, on average, welfare improving. This is important in our setting,
where 27% of participants reported that at least one family member went without a meal
in the week prior to the baseline survey, and there is a concern that defaults may cause
employees to ‘over save.’
5 Understanding the Default Effect
The effect of automatic enrollment—approximately equivalent to a 50% employer match—is
striking, and consistent with evidence on automatic payroll deductions in wealthier na-
tions.Madrian (2013) and Beshears et al. (2009) review common explanations for this large
default effect. First, and prominent in the U.S. literature, is the possibility of an ‘endorse-
ment’ effect: employees may perceive their initial assignment as a recommendation from
the employer, leading the employee to defer to the employer’s wisdom and remain at the
assigned rate. Second, there may be mechanical frictions involved in switching; when this
cost exceeds the benefit from switching, employees will remain at their default. Third and
related, employees may face large (real or perceived) cognitive costs of forming a financial
plan. Fourth, employees may be aware of their contribution and know how to switch, but
27Only one of the 161 employees defaulted to a 0% contribution with no matching incentive opted in during
the first two pay periods. Under the active decision, which effectively placed all employees in the White plan
with no matching incentives, 45 percent of employees chose to contribute.
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the decision may not be salient to the employee, or the employee may be inattentive (Karlan
et al., 2016b; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Taubinsky, 2013; Mani et al., 2013). A final
possibility is that employees with present-biased preferences may procrastinate over the de-
cision to change from the default assignment, repeatedly postponing today what they believe
they will do tomorrow (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Carroll et al., 2009).
To differentiate between these mechanisms, we randomly assigned three additional ex-
perimental interventions, conducted a series of behavioral games to elicit employees’ time
preferences, and asked a battery of pointed questions in our panel surveys. Below, we discuss
the extent to which the empirical evidence supports each potential mechanism.
5.1 Endorsement effects
A priori, we do not think our context is one in which employer endorsement effects are highly
relevant. The nature of the individual randomization, whereby each employee knew he or she
had an equal chance to be given a 0% or 5% default contribution rate, largely eliminates the
potential that employees would perceive that they were given a default rate for any reason
other than random chance.28
Further evidence of this lack of perceived endorsement can be seen in the fact that only a
few employees actively decided to switch to a 5% contribution rate, which was one of the two
rates “endorsed” by the employer. This is most evident in the right-most panel of Figure 2.
There, we see that among the population of employees offered 50% matching incentives,
a majority of those initially assigned a default contribution rate of 0% (the peach colored
bars) chose to contribute. However, only one employee increased his contribution rate to the
“endorsed” level of 5%; the vast majority instead chose to opt in at 10% (which was not a
default rate).
Qualitatively too, we found no evidence of a perceived endorsement effect. In focus
groups, employees expressed gratitude and surprise at observing the truly random assignment
of incentives, since past promotions and bonuses had created an expectation of favoritism.
When we asked employees who remained at their default why they did not change their
contribution rate, none of the employees mentioned employer endorsement, or any factor
28Specifically, all employees were informed during the mandatory training sessions that both their matching
rate and initial contribution rate would be randomly assigned by the research team. The HR staff carefully
explained that matching rates (represented by the three M-Pasandaz plans: White, Blue, and Red) could
not be changed, but that the initial contribution rate could be changed at any time by contacting Human
Resources. And at the end of each training, each employee was provided a personalized assignment card
with his or her name and position, matching plan assignment, initial contribution assignment, and phone
number for HR. These personalized cards further reinforced that both matching rate and initial contribution
rates were being randomly assigned, and that employees were free to change the contribution rate.
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involving their employer, as influencing their decision.29 Thus, while endorsement effects are
undoubtedly consequential in other settings, we believe that the employees in our study did
not perceive such a recommendation from the employer.
5.2 Mechanical frictions
We similarly find it unlikely that the default effects were driven by superficial transaction
costs involved in switching, such as confusion about how the savings account works, ambi-
guity about how to switch, or mechanical difficulties in executing a switch.30 Roshan went
to great lengths to train all employees on the M-Pasandaz account, and each employee was
sent a monthly text message on payday to indicate how much of their salary was being direct
deposited into their normal M-Paisa account and how much was being put into M-Pasandaz.
In follow-up surveys, we also find strong evidence that most employees understood their plan
type and understood what was required to change their contribution rate.31 We emphasize
that this feature of our setting is not particularly novel; switching contributions in many
settings is straightforward.
5.3 Inattention
Looking closely at Figure 1, there is some evidence that employees may have initially been
unaware of their default assignment. Specifically, we observe a modest increase in switches
on January 23rd, the day after the first payday. Some of these employees likely received a
paycheck that was different from what they expected, and this led them to switch. Subse-
quently, however, we see no more payday effects (row 4 of Table 4), and by February 28,
virtually all switching had ceased. Thus, starting in March 2015, we conducted two experi-
mental interventions to see if increasing the salience of the default assignment would induce
employees to change their contribution rate.
29Specifically, two months after the product launch, we randomly surveyed half of employees about rea-
sons for changing or not changing their contributions (N=428). None of those surveyed mentioned factors
involving the employer; rather, the most common reasons for not changing included (i) the inability to save,
(ii) not wanting to participate, and (iii) satisfaction with the default.
30Prior research on defaults similarly regards such mechanical frictions as an unlikely source of default
effects. For instance, DellaVigna (2009) estimates that a worker with a salary of $40,000 and a 50% match
rate would forgo $1,200 in matching incentives by remaining at the default contribution of 0%. Prima facie,
such a large frictional cost seems implausible.
31For instance, 285 of 295 (97%) of employees reached for the financial consultation were fully aware of
their match rate and their contribution rate. Similarly, in a phone-based survey taken at midline, 87%
of employees reported fully understanding how the M-Pasandaz product worked, more than 90% correctly
identified their plan assignment, and over 70% knew that they could change their contribution rate by calling
the human resources department.
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The first “intervention” was simply a series of monthly phone surveys, in which we asked
employees questions about their financial behaviors as well as their understanding of the
M-Pasandaz account. While the primary function of these interviews was to collect panel
data on employee activities that could not be inferred from the administrative records, we
also suspected that the survey itself might impact employee behavior by increasing their
awareness of M-Pasandaz and the salience of their financial decisions (cf. Zwane et al.,
2011). Panel phone surveys were conducted with a randomly selected half of all employees.
The second intervention was designed to increase awareness and salience by reminding
employees how to switch their contribution rate. The treatment consisted of a series of text
messages, sent roughly at the halfway point of the study, which reminded the employee of
his or her current M-Pasandaz contribution rate, as well as the phone number to call in
order to change that rate. These messages were sent in English, Dari, and Pashto, and came
from an official Roshan phone number. Messages were sent to a random subset of employees,
and were tailored to the current status of the employee. For instance, an example message
read, “M-Pasandaz Reminder: Next payday, 5% of your salary will be deposited in your
M-Pasandaz account. If you want to change your contribution, call 079999-3708” (Appendix
Figure A2).
Neither of these interventions that were designed to increase the salience of M-Pasandaz
had much impact on employee switching behavior. This is visibly apparent in Figure 1 (grey
and blue shaded regions), is tabulated in Table 4, and is estimated in the regression results
shown in Appendix Table A13. We thus conclude that, after the initial one-month period
during which roughly one third of employees switched into a non-default contribution rate,
the remaining default effect was not driven by limited attention on the part of the employee.
As we discuss below, we believe this is partially due to the fact that many employees appear
to be unable to determine what their optimal contribution should be. This stands in contrast
to other settings, such as commitment and group savings (Karlan et al., 2016b; Kast et al.,
2016), where subjects understand their preferred course of action but need nudges to behave
consistently with those preferences.
5.4 Present Bias and Cognitive costs
An important insight from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that when an action involves
immediate costs (such as the cognitive cost of determining how much to save) and delayed
benefits (such as the payout from M-Pasandaz), then na¨ıve present-biased individuals are
likely to procrastinate. Appendix B develops a simple model to situate this insight in our
setting, focusing on how present bias might cause individuals to remain at their default
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assignment.
Utility is modeled as:
U t(τ) =
βυτ − cτ if τ = tβυτ − βcτ if τ > t
where τ is the period when the switch is made, υτ is the reward (which is always delayed,
even in the sixth month of the program), and cτ is the cost. This cost includes both the
cognitive cost of determining how much to save, mechanical frictions, and any other cost
that must be borne to change one’s contribution rate. Individuals can either be exponential
discounters (β = 1), present-biased sophisticates (β < 1) who have correct beliefs, denoted
as βˆ about their future preferences (βˆ = β), or present-biased naifs, who incorrectly assume
they will not be present-biased in the future (βˆ = 1).
The essential implication, as in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), is that while a sophis-
ticate correctly knows that her future self is unlikely to participate (given current non-
participation), a naif incorrectly believes the participation constraint for her future self will
be less onerous, because she underestimates the future cost of switching. An additional
implication is that individuals who discount the future more heavily, regardless of whether
they are present biased, are less likely to participate at all because participation involves
immediate costs and delayed rewards.
This section provides three pieces of evidence which favor this characterization of the
default effect. First, an experimental measure of present bias strongly predicts remaining at
the default. Second, we find that reducing the cognitive cost of working through alternative
contribution scenarios leads to significant switching. Finally, we find that employees pro-
crastinate in accepting a financial consultation (which includes an opportunity to switch),
and that this is particularly true for present biased employees. We present each of these
results in turn.
5.4.1 Present Bias Predicts Remaining at the Default
Table 5 examines whether an experimental measure of present bias predicts remaining at the
default. We find that our measure of present bias (β) robustly predicts whether an employee
remains at the default assignment (column 1), even when controlling for a broad range of
other factors including the long run discount factor δ, employee salary, gender, a proxy for
intelligence based on “cognitive reflection” (Frederick, 2005), financial sophistication (based
on whether the employee has a bank account), salary withdrawal habits, and total baseline
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savings (column 2).32 The coefficient indicates that moving from the tenth percentile of β
in our sample (β = 0.67) to the 90th percentile (β = 1.36) is associated with a 9 percentage
point decrease in the probability that the employee remains at his default assignment. This
result is robust, and persists when we restrict the analysis to employees who are both at
their default and who have never made any withdrawals (columns 3 and 4), and when using
a simpler, unincentivized measure of present bias collected at baseline (Appendix Table
A14).33 The heterogeneity by present bias is evident in both the population defaulted in and
defaulted out (Table A15).34 Finally, in Appendix Table A16, we check for heterogeneity in
our main effects on participation by interacting default enrollment with a range of potentially
relevant covariates including present bias, cognitive reflection (intelligence), risk preferences,
salary, tenure, gender, education level and banked status. We no evidence of heterogeneity
by any factor other than present bias.
It is important to distinguish whether the short run or the long run discount factor
more robustly predicts remaining at the default. Procrastination, in the O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999) sense, means explicitly failing to accomplish something at the point in time
determined in a previous intertemporal plan. An exponential discounter who chooses not
to participate does so according to a fully optimal intertemporal plan. A partially naive
present-biased individual, by contrast, experiences a preference reversal, and fails to enroll
at a point in time when they had previously decided that they would like to do so. While prior
work, including Brown et al. (2016) and Brown and Previtero (2014), correlates individuals’
tendency to procrastinate with remaining at a default (in their case, staying in a defined
benefit, rather than switching to a defined contribution, plan), it does not allow one to
distinguish whether this is due to present-bias, or instead a low exponential discount factor.
32We trim extreme values of the β present bias parameter at the 5% and 95% level, and extreme outliers of
the δ discount factor parameter, as these appear to reflect respondents who did not understand the exercises.
33The measurement protocol for the present bias parameter used in the regression in Table 5 was a modified
version of the time-dated price list method proposed by Andreoni et al. (2015) and described in detail in
Appendix D.3. This is an incentivized measure based on actual time-dated monetary payments. One
drawback of this approach, especially given recent discussions on the elicitation of present-biased preferences
using potentially fungible monetary payments (Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2014; Andreoni et al., 2016), is the reliance on
monetary payments. Since we had a short window of time to survey each employee, and as surveys were
conducted at the employee’s place of work, we had limited options for measuring present bias. We also felt
that the protocol might be more appropriate in our context, given that a substantial share of our sample
is credit constrained. The results reported in Appendix Table A14 and described in Appendix D.3 use an
unincentivized measure of present bias, and are qualitatively unchanged. An additional advantage of using
the baseline measure to test for treatment effect heterogeneity is that it could not have been affected by
treatment.
34This provides some evidence against alternative explanations that predict a correlation between β and
being at the default for only one initial assignment. For example, if having a low β is a signal of being highly
credit constrained in a way that is not captured by salary or education, then β would predict remaining at
the default only for employees initially assigned to a 0% contribution.
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By contrast, our setting allows for experimental measures of present bias.
5.4.2 Are Cognitive Costs the Relevant Friction?
The financial consultation was designed to help reduce the employee’s cognitive cost of
developing a financial plan. Specifically, we had a representative from Human Resources
call a random subset of employees to offer them customized consultations that would answer
questions about the M-Pasandaz product, estimate the employee’s payouts under different
contribution rates, and allow the employee to change his or her contribution rate immediately.
The consultation script is provided in Appendix D.1. Relating this exercise to the model,
the consultation was intended to reduce cτ and help identify which of the costs captured by
this parameter constrain switching.
As can be seen in Figure 1 (green shaded regions) and Table 4 (row 7), the consultation
led a significant number of employees to switch (11.5%, vs. no more than 3% for the other
interventions). But what about this consultation—which may have affected employees in
several ways—was critical to helping employees switch? In our data, we observe employee
response to the consultation at six different stages: (i) whether the consultation offer was
accepted and scheduled; (ii) whether the employee answered the phone for the scheduled
consultation; (iii) whether she requested a review of the product; (iv) whether she requested
a review of her current rate; (v) whether she asked the HR officer to walk her through
different contribution scenarios; and (vi) whether she wanted to change her contribution.
Importantly, every employee was asked at each distinct stage of the consultation whether
he or she would like to skip ahead. This provides scope for exploring which element of the
consultation is most strongly associated with switching from the default.
The data indicate that it is the penultimate stage of the consultation (providing assis-
tance with financial calculations) that caused employees to switch their contribution.35 For
instance, Table 6 uses a regression to determine which stage of the consultation most strongly
predicts switching. Of the employees who accepted the financial consultations (columns 3
and 4), it is the “Calculation Assistance” stage that leads to significant switching. This effect
is unchanged even after controlling for a broad set of employee characteristics (column 4),
and is entirely driven by employees increasing their contribution rates after the consultation.
None of the other parts of the consultation correlate significantly with switching. While the
35469 of the 928 employees still active in our study were assigned to be offered a consultation. Of these,
443 employees answered the first call making the initial offer. Of these 443, 327 employees agreed to a full
consultation. Of the 327 employees who accepted the consultation, 295 were reached by the second caller
offering the consultation. Of the 295 employees who both accepted and who were reached for a consultation,
95 requested assistance with calculating how much money they would earn in different contribution scenarios.
54 employees switched their contribution rate during the consultation (49 switched up and 5 switched down),
of which 47 (87%) had requested calculation assistance.
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decision to solicit assistance is endogenous, the robustness of this correlation to several vari-
ables which should be relevant for the decision to seek calculation assistance (e.g., financial
sophistication and salary), provides some indication that the cognitive cost of switching is
a meaningful obstacle. This appears to be particularly true for those assigned a positive
default rate and still at their default, as in Appendix Table A17. It may be that for these
employees, the loss from not switching is smaller, because they are making some positive
contribution.
5.4.3 Take Up of the Consultation and Present Bias
An employee may not switch their election for many reasons. In developed countries, this
is a very broad set including confusion related to tax concerns, asset mixes, finding time
to complete the process, and so on. While the range of potential frictions in our setting
is different, we were interested in testing whether the time and mental effort involved in
switching acted as a key friction driving procrastination.
Thus, in implementing our consultation experiment, we randomly varied whether em-
ployees were offered a consultation immediately, or with a week’s delay. This experiment
was intended to mimic the experimental tests of present bias that require the completion of
some costly task either immediately, or with a delay, as implemented in the lab in Augenblick
et al. (2015) and the field in Andreoni et al. (2016). More specifically, when employees were
offered this consultation, they were either told that the consultation would occur immedi-
ately following the scheduling call, or that the consultation would occur roughly one week
after the scheduling call. Whether the offer was for a consultation now or later was random-
ized, in order to experimentally vary each subject’s ability to procrastinate over developing
a financial plan. Importantly, however, in our setting the costly task used to test for present
bias is specifically the friction that is potentially relevant to driving present bias (i.e., the
cost and mental effort required to switch elections).
Table 7 reports results from this experiment. The consultations were very popular, with
73% of employees accepting when offered an immediate consultation and 79% accepting when
offered a consultation with a week delay. This difference, reported in column 1, suggests
slightly more demand for consultations offered with a delay, although this difference is not
statistically significant (s.e. = 0.047, p = 0.182). The difference increases slightly when
controlling for other employee characteristics (column 2: s.e. = 0.048, p = 0.089), which
suggests that procrastination over the time and mental effort required to switch elections may
be an obstacle to switching elections. Interestingly, estimates reported in column 3 indicate
that for employees with β < 1, the difference is 17.7 percentage points, and is significant at
conventional levels. In column 4, we additionally interact a dummy variable equal to one for
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subjects offered the consultation with a week delay with a measure of their long run discount
factor (a dummy equal to one when δ < 1). There is no evidence of heterogeneity along
this dimension.36 However, the main interaction of interest loses significance after adding a
full set of covariates and their interactions with the consult later treatment dummy (column
5: s.e. = 0.094, p = 0.208), though the point estimate remains comparable.37 Differential
response to the consultation, therefore, should be viewed primarily as a corroboration of
our experimental measure of present bias β. Also, while the financial consultation was the
most effective approach to induce employees to switch from their default rate, even this very
heavy-handed treatment only moves a small fraction of employees.38
Relating this observation back to the potential role for (naive) present bias to create de-
fault effects, the consultation—and providing assistance with financial math in particular—
can be thought of as removing an important cost to switching. Even for naive and severely
present-biased individuals, in the model of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), completely elimi-
nating transaction costs will eliminate procrastination. This is empirically what we observe.
This also carries a policy implication: if welfare is evaluated using long run preferences, one
welfare-enhancing way to eliminate procrastination would be to eliminate switching costs.39
The evidence presented thus far indicates that present-biased employees are most likely
to remain at their default-assigned contribution rate, that present-biased employees are more
likely to accept a financial consultation when it is offered with a week delay, and that the
financial consultation—which we believe reduced the mental costs faced by employees when
deciding to switch—was the lone experimental intervention that induced a significant share
of employees to switch. The sum total of this evidence lead us to believe that much of the
default effect we observe can be explained by present bias exacerbating the cognitive cost
associated with calculating alternative savings scenarios.
36There is also no evidence of heterogeneity when interacting the delay dummy only with δ.
37In Appendix Table A18 we also find negative effects using the unincentivized baseline measure of present
bias, but lack statistical power to reject the null hypothesis.
38Appendix Table A19 explicitly compares the effect of the financial consultation with the effect of SMS
reminders on the employee’s decision to switch. While the effect of the text messages is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero, the offer of the financial consultation has a large and significant effect, partic-
ularly for subjects still at their default election (Column 2). Within this subsample, the effect of offering a
financial consultation was even larger for those subjects who were enrolled by default, i.e., who were assigned
a default contribution rate of 5% (column 3 of Appendix Table A19).
39Of course, the finding that financial consultations reduces the default effect is consistent with alternative
explanations. For example, it could just be that an extended consultation is the only action that raises
the salience of the decision enough to induce switching. However, such an explanation would be hard to
reconcile with other survey-based evidence indicating employees were acutely aware of M-Pasandaz activity.
Alternatively, the financial consultation may have influenced employees in other ways as well, for instance
by providing information that would help the employee choose an optimal contribution rate. This may be
a part of the explanation, but outside of the consultation, very few employees took the initiative to consult
an HR representative for such advice.
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5.5 Alternative Explanations
Before concluding, we address three alternative explanations for the results we have pre-
sented. The first two concern the possibility that the individual-level randomization of de-
fault and matching rates may have caused employees to behave differently than they would
have had all employees been assigned the same default contribution rate and matching in-
centives. The final point we discuss is the possibility that loss aversion, or a related form of
reference-dependent preferences, might explain the default effects.
One might be concerned that in our context, employees might behave strategically if
they believe their actions can impact future policy decisions made by the firm. However,
we believe such strategic behavior to be unlikely for several reasons. First, as noted in
Section 4 (Table 2), the default effect persisted even after all employees were standardized
onto a single plan, when employees were asked to decide about future contributions to M-
Pasandaz. At this point in the study, there was no scope for strategic behavior. Second,
we have presented robust evidence in Section 5.4.1 that a large share of employees are
present biased (roughly 41% have β < 1). The sort of strategic behavior we are concerned
with would require making a short-run sacrifice to improve the long-run outcome, which is
particularly hard to reconcile with the fact that the company has had very high rates of
employee churn: roughly 14% of all employees left the company in the year between our
baseline and endline surveys, and two years after the completion of the study, less than 50%
of employees remained active at the company. Third, while such a motivation could help
explain the decision not to opt in among employees who didn’t get matching contributions, it
does not explain why the employees randomly assigned a 5% rate did not opt out. Finally, we
raised this concern with our partners at Roshan early in the planning stages of the project,
and they considered it a highly implausible proposition. Their perception was that most
employees lived paycheck-to-paycheck, and would therefore be unlikely to intentionally forgo
salary (or matching incentives) to influence policy. Even in the relatively short 6-month
window, an employee’s contribution decisions had major economic consequences.
Related, it is possible that employees could base their contribution decisions on the plan
they were assigned relative to their peers (as in Duflo and Saez, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2013;
Bursztyn et al., 2014; Beshears et al., 2015), and that they might make different decisions
if all employees were assigned a uniform plan. For instance, an employee with no matching
incentives and a default contribution rate of 0% might choose not to increase his contribution
because he feels he got an inferior plan relative to his coworkers who receive a 50% match
on contributions. We were concerned about this possibility from the project’s inception,
and therefore worked closely with our partners at Roshan to minimize the possibility that
employees would react to their co-worker’s assignment. Specifically, the M-Pasandaz program
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was introduced to employees during hour-long training sessions that emphasized the private
nature of the individually-assigned plan and the importance that each employee make a
personal decision about his or her preferred contribution rate. Great care was taken to
explain that the study was being run by academic researchers, and that each employee had
an equal chance of being assigned to each of the different plans. Plan details were handed
out on written information cards, and employees were instructed not to ask their coworkers
about the details of their plans. While we do not believe these efforts eliminated information
sharing or possible feelings of jealousy, every effort was made to encourage each employee to
make a personal financial decision.40
A different sort of strategic behavior may arise if employees believe that their M-Pasandaz
decisions send a signal to their employer. For example, employees may hope to signal some-
thing positive about themselves by saving in their employer-provided savings account. Such
an explanation predicts an asymmetry of the default effect, where employees should either
remain at their default or increase their saving. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, default
effects exist at all levels of matching incentives and at both default rates, and a substantial
share of employees switch their contribution to zero, even when the employer is providing a
match.
Finally, we address the possibility that the default effects we observe are due in part to
loss aversion. While this explanation features less prominently in the literature—see recent
reviews by Madrian (2013), Beshears et al. (2009), and DellaVigna (2009)—it is conceivable
that the default creates a reference point and employees experience greater disutility from
giving up some benefit than the utility they would receive from getting it (Kahneman et al.,
1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). In our setting, reference points could be relevant in four
ways. First, employees who are assigned a default contribution rate of zero may not increase
their contribution because their reference point is their pre-experiment level of consumption.
However, this idea is difficult to reconcile with the substantial default effects we observe
for those employees who are initially assigned a default contribution rate of 5% and who
receive no matching incentive. This characterization predicts that these employees should
withdraw. However, as can be seen in the first panel of Figure 2, 36% of employees with no
matching incentives and a default contribution rate of 5% still contribute 5% at the end of
the study (a portion that is almost identical to the portion of employees assigned a default
contribution rate of 5% who receive 25% or 50% matching incentives). A second possibility
is that employees exhibit reference dependence with regard to the amount of the employer
40In results available upon request, we also test explicitly for evidence of peer effects, looking for evidence
that employees are more likely to participate if they had a larger fraction of their social network randomly
defaulted in to savings. In short, we find no evidence of such effects.
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match that they expect to receive. This, also, is challenging to reconcile with the large default
effects we observe for employees who do not receive any employer match. A third explanation
is that employees base their reference point on the balance in their M-Pasandaz account.
However, the design of the account—which ample evidence suggests that employees fully
understood—does not penalize employees for changing contributions. All accrued benefits
are retained regardless of contribution rate; the only action that causes employees to forfeit
matching incentives is if they make an early withdrawal from their account. If an employee
provided with a positive balance values it more than an employee provided no balance, then it
is difficult to understand why employees assigned to 5% would not be more likely to switch
up (the opposite of what we observe in the data). A final explanation is that employees
simultaneously set reference points in both the consumption and savings domains as soon as
they receive their random assignment, and their utility functions are such that any departure
would create greater losses in one domain than the gains in the other. This would need to be
true independent of the size of the matching incentive. In addition, reference points would
need to be set shortly after random assignment.41 While the wealth of evidence affirmatively
pointing to present bias leads us to believe that is a more likely candidate mechanism behind
the default effects we observe, we cannot conclusively rule out this particular form of loss
aversion with our data.
6 Conclusions
Exploiting the carefully planned launch of a new phone-based savings account, we evaluate
the role of defaults and financial incentives on the savings decisions of 949 Afghan employees.
Both effects are substantial, and together help employees accumulate meaningful savings,
with the average participating employee accumulating an M-Pasandaz balance of 12,615
Afghanis, equal to 38.9% of the average monthly salary, over the initial 6-month evaluation
period. Employees receiving no matching incentive accumulated about 18% of a month’s
salary, suggesting automatic enrollment is also potentially cost-effective. In exit interviews
with the subjects in our study, we were struck by the extent to which employees embraced
the new technology. One employee told us that on payday, all of the neighborhood clothing
41At the time of writing, understanding the speed with which reference points adapt is an active area of
research. For example, in Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) original paper, the authors point out: “Our theory
posits that preferences depend on lagged expectations, rather than expectations contemporaneous with the
time of consumption. This does not assume that beliefs are slow to adjust to new information or that people
are unaware of the choices that they have just made—but that preferences do not instantaneously change
when beliefs do. When somebody finds out 5 minutes ahead of time that she will for sure not receive a
long-expected $100, she would presumably immediately adjust her expectations to the new situation, but
she will still 5 minutes later assess not getting the money as a loss.”
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and cosmetics vendors would be excited to see her because they knew she was out to spend
a good chunk of her paycheck. M-Pasandaz helped her precommit to cutting down on that
spending, and she was happy with that change.
This paper also adds nuance to our understanding of why defaults affect behavior. In
particular, our results support the notion that default effects exist in part because present-
biased employees procrastinate over the task of making a non-default election. Here too the
regression results resonate with stories on the ground: one employee in the default-in group,
when forced to make the active savings decision at the conclusion of our study, reported
that he had been meaning to change his rate for each of the prior six months, but had never
managed to find the time to think through how a change would impact his monthly budget.
A key benefit to our study was that our implementing partner committed to a close
collaboration from the outset. We believe this example is potentially instructive for models
of engagement where these questions are most often studied: in firms in developed countries.
Our partner allowed us to work on the design and experimental implementation of the
product and to conduct a series of experiments and longitudinal surveys with their employees.
This added value for the firm. It provided them evidence on whether the default works, the
matching incentive they would need to provide to achieve a similar effect, what matching
levels they should consider, and, most importantly, whether and how this product affected
the lives of their employees. In addition, because we worked with the phone company, this
provided them evidence to determine whether they should add M-Pasandaz to their set of
commercial products, which they have done.
Nonetheless, we are still some distance from fully understanding how to characterize the
inertia that results from defaults, and in developed countries additional complications arise –
for instance, regarding taxes and asset mixes. In our view, comparable projects in developed
countries could shed substantial insight on key policy questions related to savings.
Indeed, in rich countries, the use of defaults to encourage retirement savings provides,
perhaps, the canonical example of applying behavioral insights to policy design. Appropri-
ately, most academic research on the subject uses data from these settings; this is by and
large where these programs exist. However, a growing body of research emphasizes the po-
tential for behavioral departures from rationality to be even more damaging in developing
countries. The world’s poor may face a much greater scarcity of mental resources to think
carefully about the long run; they may be credit and resource constrained in ways that exac-
erbate behavioral tendencies; they often face worse decision environments; and they typically
benefit from far fewer institutions for financial protection.
Separately, in our context, Afghanistan, the government faces a rapidly growing financial
burden in the form of pension commitments for public sector workers, which is forecasted
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to grow to as much as one-third of the annual budget in coming decades. It may be that
transitioning toward automatic enrollment in defined contribution schemes, as has happened
in developed countries, could begin to alleviate some of this burden. Our hope in designing
and evaluating this product is to provide an example of how policies and innovations designed
to overcome these obstacles in wealthy nations can be applied globally.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Switching behavior over time
Notes: Black dots indicate the number of employees calling in, on each day of the study, to change their
contribution rate. Dashed vertical lines indicate the days when employees receive their salary (dashed blue
line), and the deadline to make changes for that pay cycle (dashed red line). Shaded regions indicate the
experimental interventions of our study.
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Figure 2: Employee contributions: Initial assignments and final contribution rates
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Notes: Distribution of final M-Pasandaz contribution levels in July 2015, as a percentage of monthly salary.
Individuals were randomized into either a default 0% contribution (peach bars, N=478) or a default 5%
contribution (green bars, N=471). Individuals were further randomized into three different incentive rates:
White (0% match, N=319), Blue (25% match, N=316) and Red (50% match, N=314). Semi-transparent
bars indicate the original assigned contribution rate, solid bars indicate final contribution rate.
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Figure 3: Effect of automatic enrollment and matching contributions on (a) participation
rates (non-zero contributions), measured on February 28, 2015, following the first two pay-
days but prior to the rollout of phone surveys or secondary interventions; and (b) contribution
rates, as a fraction of the employee’s total salary, measured on February 28, 2015.31
Figure 4: M-Pasandaz participation and balance during and after RCT
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Notes: The randomized trial ran from January 2015 (month 1) until July 2015 (month 7), when bonus
payments were paid. Average participation and balance are calculated separately for employees assigned a
default contribution of 0% of their salary (Default Out) and those assigned a default contribution of 5%.
Participation is coded as missing in July 2015 as no automatic contributions were made while endline surveys
took place; deposits resumed in August 2015 based on active savings decisions in the endline survey (see
text for details).
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Table 1: The Default Effect on Participation and Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = Participates (non-zero contribution rate)
Default In (=1) 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.29
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.28 0.01 0.27 0.57
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 936 315 312 309
R-Squared 0.161 0.304 0.190 0.105
Panel B. Dependent Variable = Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
Default In (=1) 1.77 2.38 2.22 0.61
(0.26) (0.21) (0.46) (0.48)
Constant 2.70 0.03 2.61 5.54
(0.20) (0.03) (0.35) (0.39)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 936 315 312 309
R-Squared 0.046 0.293 0.071 0.005
Panel C. Dependent Variable = Total M-Pasandaz Contributions (Afs)
Default In (=1) 2426.40 2244.30 2996.73 2052.39
(750.24) (656.96) (1335.00) (1567.93)
Constant 4724.44 416.75 5015.57 8797.03
(465.52) (157.60) (802.11) (1040.07)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 949 319 316 314
R-Squared 0.011 0.036 0.016 0.005
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel, Participates (=1), is a binary variable that
equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and dependent variable in middle
panel, Contribution Rate (% of Salary), is the monthy contribution rate into M-Pasandaz
as a percent of total salary. Participates and Contribution Rate reflect values observed
as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone
surveys or secondary interventions. Dependent variable in third panel is total contributions
made by the employee to M-Pasandaz, in Afghanis, as observed in administrative data.
Value reflects total contributions net of withdrawals as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the
disbursement of matching incentives. Value does not include matching contributions made
by the employer. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 2: The Default Effect on Active Decision at Trial End
Continued M-Pasandaz After Program (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.48
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 811 272 277 262
R-Squared 0.011 0.025 0.005 0.007
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the employee
made an active decision to continued contributing to the M-Pasandaz after the 6
month study ended with no matching incentives offered. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: The Default Effect on Savings Behavior, Financial Security, and Well-Being
Outcome: Control Default Naive List et al Bonferonni
Mean Effect p-Value p-Value p-Value
Panel A: Composite Indices
Importance of Saving Index -0.004 0.142 0.002 0.012 0.013
Financial Security Index 0.002 0.111 0.005 0.019 0.033
Well-Being Index -0.001 0.025 0.512 0.757 1.000
Panel B: Importance of Saving Index Variables:
Savings is Important (=1) 0.954 0.004 0.756 0.767 1.000
Attempts to Save Each Month (=1) 0.627 0.074 0.026 0.051 0.078
M-Paz Changed Desire to Save 0.539 0.092 0.009 0.032 0.034
Panel C: Financial Security Index Variables:
Not Financially Constrained (=1) 0.639 0.073 0.026 0.100 0.128
Confident Meeting Current Fin. Obligations (=1) 0.929 0.036 0.020 0.091 0.097
Confident Meeting Future Fin. Obligations (=1) 0.798 0.023 0.412 0.663 1.000
Will Retire Someday (=1) 0.373 0.001 0.971 0.973 1.000
Financial Satisfaction (1 - 10) 6.443 0.323 0.027 0.083 0.142
Panel D: Well-Being Index Variables:
Nights No One Without Food 6.616 0.042 0.518 0.892 1.000
Happy Overall (=1) 0.932 0.003 0.853 0.851 1.000
Life Satisfaction (1 - 10) 7.863 0.036 0.810 0.965 1.000
Good Physical Health (=1) 0.768 0.072 0.010 0.051 0.055
Healthy Last Three Months (=1) 0.968 0.010 0.441 0.902 1.000
Panel E: Other Variables:
Satisfied at Roshan (=1) 0.771 0.017 0.548 0.799 1
Left Roshan (=1) 0.142 0.004 0.850 0.855 1
Notes: This table reports the effects of defaulting employees into the M-Pasandaz automatic salary withdrawal savings account.
Indices are created as the covariance-weighted sum of z-scores of the underlying variables, following the technique described in
Anderson (2008). List et al. (2016) and Bonferonni P-values are calculated controlling for the Family Wise Error Rate for the
first five variables reported in the table, and then for each set of variables underlying the index respectively. Full text of the
survey questions used to create indices is available in Appendix D.2.
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Table 4: Contribution rate switches, by default contribution and matching incentives
Default Out Default In
N Total % 0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50%
Changed In Open Enrollment 326 943 34.57 0 32 68 75 80 71
Changed After 1st Payday 22 943 2.33 0 7 4 3 6 2
Changed By February 28th 385 936 41.13 1 42 89 84 89 80
Changed After Other Payday 2 936 0.21 0 1 0 0 0 1
Changed After Survey 3 441 0.68 0 0 0 1 2 0
Changed After SMS 6 224 2.68 0 0 2 2 2 0
Changed After Consultation 54 469 11.51 10 7 6 8 11 12
Changed More Than Once 14 949 1.48 2 2 5 2 3 0
Ever Changed Contribution 459 949 48.37 11 49 96 100 107 96
Never Changed Contribution 456 890 51.24 142 101 57 51 50 55
Observations 161 158 159 158 158 155
Notes: “N” indicates the number of unique employees who changed their contribution rate as a result of the
action. “Total” indicates the number of participants that were treated by the specified treatment and is adjusted
to account for attrition at the time of calculation. For example, “Ever Changed Contribution” row includes all
949 employees, while “Never Changed Contribution” includes only 890 employees still present in final month
of study. Payday, Survey, SMS and Consultation switches are recorded if corresponding to the day of the
intervention or the day immediately afterwards.
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Table 5: Present Bias and Contribution Changes
Dependent Variable: Still at Default on February 28 Still at Default and
No Withdrawal on Feb. 28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias Parameter (β) -0.132 -0.132 -0.088 -0.089
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Long Run Discount Factor (δ) 0.028 0.029
(0.053) (0.054)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) -0.060 -0.069
(0.025) (0.025)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Salary (1000 Afs) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) -0.009 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Male (=1) 0.055 0.055
(0.055) (0.055)
Education Level -0.002 -0.005
(0.018) (0.018)
Uses a Bank Account (=1) -0.041 -0.037
(0.041) (0.041)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday (=1) 0.024 0.026
(0.040) (0.040)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.077 0.056
(0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.726 0.679 0.634 0.589
(0.054) (0.126) (0.055) (0.128)
Control Mean 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
R-Squared 0.009 0.032 0.004 0.026
# Employees 702 678 702 678
Notes: This table reports on the variables that predict whether a participant remains at their default election on February
28, 2015, two months after the start of the experiment. β is a measure of present bias obtained in an experimental elicitation
completed at endline with real stakes (see paper text for details). Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) is the total of three questions
answered correctly using a variant of Frederick (2005)’s cognitive reflection test. The remaining variables are described in
Appendix D.2. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 6: Which Element of the Consultation is Associated with Switching?
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After February 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned Consultation (=1) 0.091
(0.018)
Accepted Consultation (=1) 0.154
(0.024)
Did Not Delay Consultation (=1) -0.083 -0.090
(0.270) (0.273)
Asked for Overview of M-Paz (=1) 0.042 0.070
(0.047) (0.051)
Initial Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.047 0.050
(0.049) (0.052)
Aware of M-Paz Plan and Rate (=1) -0.139 -0.171
(0.079) (0.088)
Asked to Repeat Projected Balance (=1) 0.124 0.114
(0.066) (0.069)
Calculation Assistance (=1) 0.377 0.387
(0.058) (0.058)
Additional Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.043 0.034
(0.058) (0.064)
Control Mean 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.16
Covariates NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.027 0.040 0.312 0.332
# Employees 927 443 295 287
Notes: This table reports which elements of the financial consultation predict whether an
employee switches their contribution. 469 of the 928 employees still active in our study at the
time of this intervention were assigned to be offered a consultation, establishing the sample for
column (1). Of these, 443 employees answered the call making the initial offer, establishing the
sample for column (2). Of these 443, 327 employees agreed to a full consultation. Accepted
Consultation is a dummy variable equal to 1 for these employees. Of the 327 employees who
accepted the consultation, 295 were reached by the second caller offering the consultation,
forming the sample for column (3). Of the 295 employees who both accepted and who were
reached for a consultation, all completed the consultation. 291 were able to talk immediately
(Did Not Delay Consultation=1), while 4 could not and were reached later. 259 requested
an overview of the M-Pasandaz product (Asked for Overview of M-Paz=1), while 36 did not.
91 employees had initial questions about the M-Pasandaz product (Initial Questions about M-
Paz=1), while 204 did not. 285 confirmed that they were aware of their plan and contribution
rate (Aware of M-Paz Plan and Rate=1), while 10 were not. All were informed of their projected
balance after six months including any potential bonus payments, and 52 employees asked
for this information to be repeated (Asked to Repeat Projected Balance=1), while 242 did
not. All were offered assistance with calculating how much money they would earn in different
contribution scenarios, 95 requested assistance (Calculation Assistance=1), while 200 did not.
Requesting assistance was not required to change the level of contribution to M-Pasandaz during
the consultation call. 53 employees had additional questions about the M-Pasandaz product
(Additional Questions about M-Paz=1), while 242 did not. Sample size in column 1 includes
full sample subject to attrition when consultation was offered, column 2 sample includes all
employees assigned a consultation, column 3 sample includes all employees who accepted a
consultation, and column 4 excludes employees missing covariates. The additional covariates
are: cognitive reflection test, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level,
uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Consultation Offer Results By Present Bias
Accepted Consultation (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consult Later 0.063 0.081 0.008 0.056 0.510
(0.047) (0.048) (0.065) (0.126) (0.271)
Present Biased (=1) -0.038 -0.035 0.005
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
Consult Later x Present Biased 0.177 0.168 0.119
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Impatient (=1) 0.018 0.048
(0.098) (0.098)
Consult Later x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.054
(0.068)
Consult Later x Risk Preference -0.013
(0.017)
Consult Later x Salary -0.004
(0.002)
Consult Later x Tenure at Roshan 0.003
(0.017)
Consult Later x Male -0.093
(0.153)
Consult Later x Education Level -0.015
(0.038)
Consult Later x Uses a Bank Account 0.068
(0.103)
Consult Later x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.170
(0.097)
Consult Later x Capable of Fixing Phone -0.063
(0.104)
Constant 0.727 0.769 0.801 0.787 0.555
(0.034) (0.116) (0.122) (0.157) (0.209)
Control Mean 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 329 329 329 329 329
R-Squared 0.005 0.039 0.052 0.052 0.091
Notes: Accepted Consultation Offer (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the employee agreed to participation in
a financial consultation regarding their participation in the M-Pasandaz program (see paper text for details). Consult
Later (=1) is a binary variable that equals zero if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a consultation on
the same day as the consultation offer was made, and equals one if the consultation was assigned to take place one
week later. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an
experimental present bias elicitation completed at endline with real stakes and Impatient (=1) is a binary variable that
equals one if an employee is identified as having δ < 1 (see paper text for details). Columns (2), (4) and (5) include
covariates for cognitive reflection task, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank
account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone – see Appendix D.2 for questions. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses.
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A Impacts on Total Savings
All employees participated in face-to-face baseline (January 2015) and endline (August 2015)
surveys. Half of all employees were also randomly selected to participate in higher-frequency
phone surveys, which occurred in March, May, June, and July of 2015. As we discuss in
greater detail in Section 5.3, only half of all employees were selected for high-frequency
surveys out of concern that being surveyed might, by itself, change savings behavior.
To study the effects of default assignment on total savings, we measure savings using
monthly panel data, as described in the main manuscript. Our questions regard savings at
the household level, since most participants are the primary breadwinner in their household.
The monthly surveys captured flows in the five main financial household savings instruments
relevant for our sample: (i) the M-Pasandaz wallet; (ii) the M-Paisa wallet; (iii) as cash; (iv)
in a bank account; or (v) as loans given to family and friends. We also aggregate these
five types of savings to look at a sixth savings measure: total financial savings. Given our
sample of urban salaried employees, these measures provide a fairly comprehensive overview
of potential savings.42 These survey data are likely reported with error, but the fact that
we observe M-Pasandaz balances in both the survey and administrative data gives us some
insight into potential misreporting. As we discuss in Appendix C.2, there is evidence of
confusion by some employees on whether to report stocks (which can be read easily and
precisely by looking at the M-Paisa interface) or flows; after correcting for this, we observe
a correlation between the survey and administrative measures of r = 0.85.
Appendix Table A7 examines the impact of defaults on different types of savings. Our
base specification uses a difference-in-difference estimator by regressing monthly flows (Yit)
between individuals assigned a default contribution rate of 5% (Default Ini = 1) and 0%
(Default Ini = 1):
Yit = γ1Default Ini · Postt + ηi + ψt + εit,
Here, Postt is an indicator equal to one in the post-treatment period (survey waves 2 - 5) and
ηi and ψt are employee and survey wave fixed effects, respectively. We investigate whether
42While previous development studies have focused on non-financial savings behaviors (cf. Rosenzweig et
al., 1993), including jewelry, livestock or durables, these appear to be less relevant in our population of urban
wage-earners. At the baseline survey, only 2% of respondents reported non-traditional savings, and we do
not find evidence of default effects on self-reported asset ownership in Appendix Table A8.
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the default effect varies depending on the assigned employer match rate by estimating:
Yit = β1 25% Match ·Default Outi · Postt + β2 50% Match ·Default Outi · Postt
+ β3 0% Match ·Default Ini · Postt + β4 25% Match ·Default Ini · Postt
+ β5 50% Match ·Default Ini · Postt + ηi + ψt + εit,
such that each β coefficient provides the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of
treatment assignment relative to the omitted category (0% employer match and defaulted
out). In this latter specification, our power for pairwise tests of differences in means is
somewhat limited by the fact that we are comparing 6 different treatment conditions across
only 470 employees.
Estimates in Panel A indicate that default enrollment in M-Pasandaz causes a positive but
statistically insignificant increase in total savings (Column 1). Across all savings instruments,
the only significant effect is an increase in M-Pasandaz savings, which is evident in both the
administrative (Column 2) and survey (Column 3) data. We also find positive effects of
default enrollment on regular M-Paisa account flows using survey data (Column 4). The
remaining columns report somewhat imprecisely measured effects of default assignment on
alternative savings instruments (Columns 5-6), loans and transfers made (Column 7) and
expenditures (Columns 8-9).43 While the estimates are imprecise, in the aggregate, they
indicate that both M-Pasandaz and M-Paisa savings are going up, and that may reflect a
reduction in cash savings and/or consumption expenditure.
The average default effect masks considerable heterogeneity. In particular, our sample has
remarkable variation in salary levels, ranging from about $150 USD a month (e.g., guards and
janitors) to over $3,000 USD a month (senior managers). Consistent with prior work showing
that the default is most important for poorer individuals (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et
al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010a), we find large and statistically significant increases in total
savings for employees in the lowest salary quartile (Panel B of Appendix Table A7). In this
quartile, the net increase in savings is driven by increases in M-Pasandaz and M-Paisa, and is
partially offset by a reduction in cash savings. We interpret these results with some caution,
however. First, while the ‘sources and uses’ add up sensibly for the aggregate sample, in the
poorest quartile it appears that both savings and consumption are increasing. Logically, this
is only possible if employees or their household members are taking on additional outside
work, which we did not record as our sample is salaried (though janitors and guards in
43We might expect the increase in M-Pasandaz savings to crowd out other forms of borrowing (Beshears et
al., 2010b). We observe no effect on borrowing, but this may be due to the fact that our population tended
to be net lenders – less than 6% of our population (53/947) reported receiving loans or transfers at baseline,
a number that did not change significantly over the course of our study.
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the sample certainly could be increasing household labor participation).44 We additionally
examine whether the M-Pasandaz account assisted subjects in dealing with shocks, but find
no empirical evidence that it did so over the 6 months of this study (results available on
request).
In addition to the default effects discussed above, the financial incentives offered by M-
Pasandaz led to sizable increases in total savings (see Appendix Table A9), which appear
to come from reductions in general expenditures (though food expenditure, specifically, is
unaffected). Employees in the 50% match group, for example, save about 4,000 more AFs
per month (about $60 USD), independent of default status, than those defaulted out in the
0% match group. The median monthly salary in our sample is about $450 USD, so the
M-Pasandaz program increased monthly savings by about 13% of monthly wages.
Of related interest is how employees perceived these savings and the M-Pasandaz account
more generally. M-Pasandaz is a new product, with some features of a mobile money wallet,
and some features of a defined contribution savings account. Employees thought M-Pasandaz
was most similar to a savings account at a bank (Appendix Figure A3), and generally viewed
their accumulated savings as long-term savings. Indeed, of the 349 employees who made
contributions to their M-Pasandaz account, only about half (n=186) had made a withdrawal
at the time of the endline survey, with the remainder opting to leave the accrued balance
untouched. When asked about their plans for this money, the most common response (after
“Don’t know”) was that employees planned to retain their M-Pasandaz balance as savings
for the future (Appendix Figure A4).
44Callen et al. (2017) find that a new savings product increases labor market participation for microen-
trepreneurs in Sri Lanka. An additional concern with these types of outcomes is that, especially in richer
populations, the underlying distributions are fat-tailed, which may mean that substantial samples are re-
quired for the sampling distribution of the regression estimates to converge to their limiting distribution.
This is potentially less of a concern in the bottom quartile of this sample, where monthly flows are smaller.
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B Present Bias and the Default Effect
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), it is evident that when an action involves imme-
diate costs and delayed benefits, then na¨ıve present-biased individuals are likely to procras-
tinate. The decision of whether to undertake the costly action of enrolling in M-Pasandaz
today, in order to received the delayed benefits of an employer match, reflect such a decision.
This section presents a simple framework to situate this insight in our setting.
Consider an employee who is defaulted out of M-Pasandaz and in the 50% match group
who faces an immediate cost of switching κ. The employee is deciding whether to enter the
program. To simplify, imagine the employee is considering whether to make a $2 monthly
contribution and if the employee enters, then they will make no further switches. The
program runs for six months t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}, benefits are paid out in t = 7 at the conclusion
of the trial, and, without loss of generality, that the employee has a one period discount factor
δ = 1. If the employee starts making contributions in period t, they will invest $2(7− t) of
principal over the course of the trial and receive back $(7− t) in employer matches.
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), assume the employee has utility function:
U t(τ) =
βυτ − cτ if τ = tβυτ − βcτ if τ > t
where τ is the period when the switch is made, υτ is the reward (which is always delayed,
even in the sixth month of the program), and cτ is the cost. Individuals can either be
exponential discounters (β = 1), present-biased sophisticates (β < 1) who have correct
beliefs, denoted as βˆ about their future preferences (βˆ = β), or present-biased naifs, who
incorrectly assume they will not be present-biased in the future (βˆ = 1). We assume that
the payoff for never participating in M-Pasandaz is 0.
The benefits to participation are therefore υτ = 3(7 − τ), as two dollars in principal
plus one dollar in employer match is provided per period of participation, and the costs are
cτ = κ + 2 + β2(6 − τ), reflecting the switching cost and the stream of payments into the
account over the life of the trial.
An exponential discounter switches if (9 − τ) > κ + 2. Because this is declining in τ ,
a basic prediction is that if an exponential discounter is going to switch at all, they do so
immediately. This embodies the simple intuition that if participation is worthwhile in one
period, then, with no discounting, it is worthwhile in every period, so the employee should
take advantage of the full potential employer match.
A present-biased sophisticate displays a similar pattern of equilibrium behavior. In any
period, a present-biased sophisticate should switch if β(9− τ) > κ+ 2. For a fixed κ, there
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exist degrees of present bias such that an exponential discounter will enroll and a present-
biased sophisticate will never enroll. Nonetheless, if it is ever worthwhile for a sophisticate
to enroll, they should do so in the first period.
A present-biased naif, by contrast, could potentially never enroll, while always incorrectly
believing that they will do so in the next period. Consider the simple example of β = 1/2
and κ = 3. Then, in period 1, the employee will not enroll 8β < κ + 2 ⇔ 4 < 5, as the
present discounted benefits are less than the current cost of switching. However, in period
1, they incorrectly believe that they will invest in period 2 if 7 > κ + 2, which, in this case
holds. Yet, when period 2 arrives, they will not invest, as 7β < κ+ 2.
The essential insight here is that while a sophisticate correctly knows that his future self
will only participate if β(9 − τ) > κ + 2, a naif incorrectly believes their future self will
participate if 9 − τ > κ + 2. That is, they think the constraint for their future selfs to
participate is less onerous than it will in fact be when the future becomes the present.
An additional, albeit basic, insight that follows is that individuals who discount the future
more heavily, regardless of whether they are present biased, are less likely to participate at
all because participation involves immediate costs and delayed rewards. For this reason, we
also include estimates of the one period discount factor in addition to a separate measure
for present bias when trying to predict which of our subjects remain at the default.
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C Additional Tests of Robustness
C.1 Robustness of Main Effects
Employees assigned a default contribution rate of 5% could also exit their account by making
monthly withdrawals, rather than calling Human Resources and switching their contribution.
In Appendix Table A4, we test robustness of the observed default effect when participation
is redefined to mean both contributing some portion of salary to the program and never
having made a withdrawal. Using this definition, defaulting employees in increases employee
participation by 34 percentage points in the white and blue plans, and by 26 percentage
points in the red plan, with all three differences being highly statistically significant. In
Appendix Table A5, we show the main effects for particiption and contribution rate using
the values of these variables at the end of the study on July 15th instead of February 28th,
following the series of follow-up interventions. At this time, defaulting employees in increases
participation by 33 percentage points, and contribution rates by 1.56 percentage points, with
similar patterns by matching rates to Table 1.
C.2 Measurement Error in Survey Data
To assess the quality of our panel survey data, we first examine whether survey data on M-
Pasandaz balances, which is potentially subject to measurement error due to inaccurate recall
or misreporting, corresponds to our administrative data which is measured without error.
For the specific case of the M-Pasandaz balance, however, we can directly compare our survey
measure of reported flows into the account with the administrative record. This comparison
reveals two systematic problems with the survey measure. First, a subsample of employees
appears to respond to the survey question, designed to measure monthly flows, by reporting
their current stock. If we adjust the data by replacing the monthly survey flow as the
difference between monthly survey responses, the correlation between the administrative and
the survey measure rises from 0.51 to 0.71. Second, all respondents appear to report negative
flows as zero. The correlation between the adjusted survey measure and the administrative
measure rises to 0.85 if we exclude individuals who report a monthly flow of zero from the
data. Appendix Table A7 reports results using both the administrative data and the monthly
survey data adjusting the survey response to a monthly flow using the difference between
monthly survey responses for those who appear to be reporting their current stock.
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Figure A1: Switching behavior over time
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Notes: Dots indicate the number of individuals calling in, on a given day, to change their contribution rate.
Top figure shows number of switches by default enrollment status; middle figure shows switches by plan
assignment; bottom figure shows these switches in the context of the treatments that were administered to
random subsets of the population over the course of the study.
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Figure A2: M-Pasandaz reminder message
58
Figure A3: Employee perceptions of M-Pasandaz
Notes: Responses collected in the endline survey, after the termination of the study period. Bars indicate
the percent of employees who chose each option. Employees could only choose one option.
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Figure A4: Employee uses and plans for M-Pasandaz savings
Notes: Responses collected in the endline survey, after the termination of the study period. Employees
could give multiple responses to each question. Bars indicate the fraction of all employee responses that
were affirmative for each expenditure category.
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Table A1: Default Savings Effects in Related Literature
Reference Study population Default Effect Estimate
Bernheim et al.
(2015)
Employees across three large
U.S. firms in chemicals,
insurance and food
Estimating a model of costly opt-out in retirement savings
decisions, 60% of workers have positive opt-out costs, and
40% act as if opt-out costs are negligible (Table 3).
Beshears et al.
(2009)
Subset of employees of a
U.S. office equipment firm
When the default contribution rate is increased from 3%
to 6%, participation at the default increases from 28% to
49%. Participation at or above 6% increases from 65% to
79% (Figure 5.3).
Beshears et al.
(2010b)
645 employees at a U.S.
information sector firm
89% of employees participated when given a 25% match;
80.7% participated with no match. The average
contribution rate also fell from 3.60 percent to 2.89
percent (Table 11.2).
Bronchetti et
al. (2011)
259 eligible tax filers at 8
IRS sponsored Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance
(VITA) sites in the U.S.
The treatment raised savings bond participation by no
more than 8 percentage points (Table 3).
Brune et al.
(2017)
474 households in 10 villages
in Malawi
Net deposits are 2.9 times higher one week later for
treatment households who are given a direct transfer
compared to the control group who receives their transfer
in cash (Table 4).
Carroll et al.
(2009)
4,580 of 46,944 employees at
a U.S. financial services firm
Enrollment rates are 29 percentage points higher when
employees are forced to make an active enrollment
decision (69%) than under a standard enrollment process
with default non-enrollment (41%) (Figure 1).
Chetty et al.
(2014)
4 million individuals with
savings accounts from the
population of Denmark
85% of individual savers in Denmark can be described as
passive savers who do not respond to subsidies for
retirement accounts, but are instead influenced by the
automatic contributions made for them (Page 1143).
Dobrescu et al.
(2016)
16,988 members of an
Australian pension plan
Among highly educated permanent employees, there is a
4.4% decreased probability that a default member will opt
out of the voluntary contributions default (Table 3).
Luco (2013)
8,888 individuals enrolled in
the Chilean Pension System
55% of people in the Chilean fixed pension system did not
switch from the default saving option, despite significant
changes in the economic environment over the period of
fourteen years (Figure 4).
Goda and
Manchester
(2013)
925 existing union employees
at at U.S. non-profit firm
When an age threshold determines enrollment in defined
benefit (DB) vs. defined contribution (DC), employees
defaulted into DC are 60 percentage points more likely to
enroll in DC plan than those defaulted into DB (Figure 1).
Madrian and
Shea (2001)
13,355 employees from a U.S
health care insurance firm
61 percent of employees hired under automatic enrollment
do nothing to move away from the employer-set default
rate for their 401(k) plan (Table 8).
Somville and
Vandewalle
(2017)
442 villagers in 18 villages in
rural India
Being paid in bank account instead of cash increases the
account balance by 420 Rupees (110 percent) after three
months of weekly payments. Villagers paid in cash do not
save more in other assets and rather increase expenditures
on regular consumption by 402 Rupees (Table 4).
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
Default Out Default In
0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50% P-Value
All Match Match Match Match Match Match of F-Test
Gender (Male = 1) 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.59
(0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.33)
Married (=1) 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.98
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Age (Years) 30.39 30.30 30.13 30.58 30.51 29.98 30.87 0.94
(7.88) (7.51) (7.33) (8.34) (8.14) (7.63) (8.38)
Cognitive Reflection Task 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.70
(0.82) (0.81) (0.77) (0.80) (0.85) (0.86) (0.80)
Risk Preference (1-10) 4.93 5.06 4.74 5.11 5.22 4.59 4.88 0.43
(3.05) (3.17) (3.18) (2.96) (3.04) (3.02) (2.92)
Monthly Salary (1000 Afs) 32.43 30.41 31.20 33.86 34.39 31.72 33.04 0.84
(30.79) (25.01) (24.12) (38.68) (34.84) (26.25) (33.27)
Monthly Savings (1000 Afs) 15.73 12.20 28.26 11.78 16.49 10.77 14.97 0.28
(57.96) (27.70) (119.05) (25.90) (35.77) (21.11) (52.61)
Tenure At Roshan (Years) 5.83 5.73 6.02 5.76 6.02 5.47 6.01 0.53
(3.14) (3.12) (3.15) (3.35) (3.08) (3.08) (3.04)
Education Level (1-6) 4.79 4.80 4.74 4.73 4.87 4.86 4.76 0.84
(1.23) (1.19) (1.30) (1.24) (1.10) (1.23) (1.30)
Has Bank Account (=1) 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.88
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Delayed a Bill Payment (=1) 0.41 0.43 0.36 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.40
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Withdraws Entire Salary (=1) 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.82
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.71
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Interested in M-Pasandaz (=1) 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.84 0.63
(0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.38) (0.31) (0.37)
Present Biased Baseline (=1) 0.32 0.25 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.30
(0.47) (0.43) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
Present Biased Endline (=1) 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.61
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Observations 949 161 158 159 158 158 155
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. See Appendix D.2 for covariate questions. Present Biased Baseline (=1) is a binary
variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an unincentivized present bias elicitation completed at baseline, and
Present Biased Endline (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an experimental present
bias elicitation completed at endline with real stakes (see paper text for details).
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Table A3: Self-reported Reasons for Switching Contribution Rates
Default Out Default In
N Total % 0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50%
Panel A: Reasons for increasing contribution rate
Increased - Savings Important 189 285 66.32 7 32 59 9 36 46
Increased - Wanted Incentives 107 285 37.54 0 15 46 0 18 28
Increased - Support Roshan 10 285 3.51 1 1 1 1 3 3
Increased - Demand Commitment 8 285 2.81 0 3 3 0 2 0
Increased - Thought Automatic 5 285 1.75 0 3 2 0 0 0
Panel B: Reasons for decreasing contribution rate
Decreased - Salary Too Low 52 170 30.59 0 0 0 22 17 13
Decreased - Incentives Too Low 49 170 28.82 0 0 0 48 0 1
Decreased - Expenses Too High 35 170 20.59 0 0 0 10 19 6
Decreased - Un-Islamic Product 24 170 14.12 0 0 0 5 10 9
Decreased - Better Options 4 170 2.35 0 0 0 3 1 0
Notes: Total in column 2 reports number of participants that either decreased their contribution rate (rows 1-5) or
increased their contribution rate (rows 6-10). Reasons were not mutually exclusive and respondents were asked to
report all relevant reasons for changing their contribution. “Decreased - Salary Too Low” indicates that respondents
felt their salary was not sufficiently large to allow for savings. “Decreased - Incentives Too Low” indicates that
respondents felt the incentives were not sufficiently high for savings. “Decreased - Expenses Too High” indicates
that respondents felt their other expenses were too high for savings. “Decreased - Un-Islamic Product” indicates
that respondents felt the M-Pasandaz product did not conform with Islamic practices. “Decreased - Better Op-
tions” indicates that respondents reported having better alternative savings options available. “Increased - Savings
Important” indicates that respondents said savings was an important goal for them. “Increased - Wanted Incen-
tives” indicates that respondents mentioned the incentives as important to their decision. “Increased - Support
Roshan” indicates that respondents mentioned wanting to support Roshan’s development of a new product. “In-
creased - Demand Commitment” indicates that respondents mentioned needing commitment devices to help save.
“Increased - Thought Automatic” indicates that respondents mentioned thinking they were automatically enrolled
in the program when they were not.
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Table A4: The Default Effect on Robustness to Withdrawing to Exit the Account
Dependent Variable: Participates and No Withdrawal (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.31
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant 0.01 0.26 0.55 0.27
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Sample 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match Full Sample
# Observations 316 313 309 938
R-Squared 0.194 0.111 0.073 0.096
Notes: Participates and No Withdrawal (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the
contribution rate is greater than zero and the employee never withdrew from their account.
The dependent variable reflect employees’ status as of February 28, 2015, following the first
two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone surveys or secondary interventions. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A5: The Default Effect on Participation and Contribution (as of July 15)
Panel A: The effect on participation
Dependent Variable: Participates (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.23
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.32 0.07 0.32 0.60
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 890 298 299 293
R-Squared 0.108 0.174 0.148 0.064
Panel B: The effect on contribution rate
Dependent Variable: Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Default In (=1) 1.56 1.89 2.20 0.42
(0.29) (0.29) (0.50) (0.50)
Constant 3.11 0.46 3.07 5.92
(0.22) (0.16) (0.38) (0.40)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 890 298 299 293
R-Squared 0.032 0.125 0.062 0.002
Notes: Participates (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the contribution rate is
greater than zero, Contribution (% of Salary) is the monthy contribution rate into M-
Pasandaz as a percent of total salary, and an observation is an employee. Variables reflect
contribution rate values observed as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the disbursement of
matching incentives. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A6: The Default Effect: Heterogeneity by Salary Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = Participates (non-zero contribution rate)
Default In (=1) 0.45 0.37 0.42 0.37
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.28
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Salary Quartile Sample 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
# Observations 239 227 236 234
R-Squared 0.200 0.134 0.173 0.141
Panel B. Dependent Variable = Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
Default In (=1) 1.69 1.59 2.16 1.61
(0.48) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54)
Constant 2.34 3.00 2.63 2.83
(0.38) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Salary Quartile Sample 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
# Observations 239 227 236 234
R-Squared 0.049 0.036 0.066 0.036
Panel C. Dependent Variable = Total M-Pasandaz Contributions (Afs)
Default In (=1) 734.38 260.73 2871.54 5995.37
(362.10) (602.29) (934.56) (2546.34)
Constant 1501.72 3291.68 4138.81 9939.97
(263.60) (439.28) (656.27) (1546.56)
Salary Quartile Sample 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
# Observations 244 231 237 237
R-Squared 0.017 0.001 0.038 0.023
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel, Participates (=1), is a binary variable that
equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and dependent variable in middle
panel, Contribution Rate (% of Salary), is the monthy contribution rate into M-Pasandaz
as a percent of total salary. Participates and Contribution Rate reflect values observed
as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone
surveys or secondary interventions. Dependent variable in third panel is total contributions
made by the employee to M-Pasandaz, in Afghanis, as observed in administrative data.
Value reflects total contributions net of withdrawals as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the
disbursement of matching incentives. Value does not include matching contributions made
by the employer. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A8: The Default Effect on Asset Ownership
Baseline Endline
Default Default Default Default Mean Difference in
Out In Out In Difference Difference
Asset Index 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05
[2.25] [2.18] [2.25] [2.27] (0.16) (0.13)
Rooms (#) 3.31 3.23 3.74 3.58 0.16 -0.09
[2.08] [1.98] [2.23] [1.77] (0.14) (0.15)
Beds (#) 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.92 -0.11 0.15
[1.16] [1.17] [1.24] [1.32] (0.09) (0.09)
Air Conditioners (#) 0.21 0.19 0.33 0.38 -0.05 0.08
[0.80] [0.63] [0.82] [0.85] (0.06) (0.06)
Heaters (#) 1.31 1.25 1.21 1.32 -0.11 0.16
[1.38] [1.17] [1.15] [1.30] (0.09) (0.09)
Stoves (#) 1.38 1.39 1.35 1.41 -0.05 0.10
[0.89] [0.99] [1.04] [0.87] (0.07) (0.08)
Washing Machines (#) 1.05 1.02 1.10 1.09 0.01 0.03
[0.62] [0.55] [0.72] [0.59] (0.05) (0.04)
Refrigerators (#) 0.86 0.87 1.00 0.94 0.06 -0.08
[0.66] [0.59] [0.60] [0.59] (0.04) (0.04)
Sewing Machines (#) 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.09 -0.00 0.01
[0.77] [0.77] [0.85] [0.67] (0.05) (0.05)
Televisions (#) 1.76 1.76 1.88 1.87 0.01 -0.01
[1.07] [1.11] [1.25] [1.17] (0.08) (0.07)
VCR/DVD Players (#) 0.61 0.66 0.64 0.66 -0.01 -0.03
[0.86] [0.86] [0.93] [0.89] (0.06) (0.07)
Mobile Phones (#) 4.97 4.85 4.70 4.49 0.21 -0.07
[2.59] [2.91] [2.77] [2.79] (0.20) (0.18)
Computers (#) 1.40 1.36 1.38 1.42 -0.04 0.09
[1.17] [1.08] [1.11] [1.14] (0.08) (0.07)
Bicycles (#) 0.82 0.76 0.86 0.77 0.09 -0.01
[0.91] [0.96] [0.95] [0.92] (0.07) (0.06)
Motorcycles (#) 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.18 -0.02 -0.01
[0.51] [0.51] [0.50] [0.46] (0.03) (0.03)
Automobiles (#) 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.02 -0.03
[0.56] [0.62] [0.61] [0.64] (0.04) (0.04)
Livestock (#) 0.54 0.52 0.60 0.34 0.27 -0.28
[2.78] [2.86] [2.24] [1.39] (0.13) (0.22)
Observations 473 467 409 404
Notes: Standard deviations reported in brackets and standard errors reported in parentheses. Asset Index is the
first principal component of the full set of asset variables below. Columns (1) and (2) report mean values during
the baseline survey in October 2014 for default out and default in groups, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report
mean values during the endline survey in August 2015 for default out and default in groups, respectively. Column
(5) reports the difference in means and standard error from a t-test comparing default out and default in groups
at endline, while Column (6) reports the coefficient and standard errors from a difference-in-difference estimate
comparing default out and default in groups between endline and baseline.
68
T
ab
le
A
9:
T
h
e
D
ef
au
lt
E
ff
ec
t
on
S
av
in
gs
,
b
y
M
at
ch
in
g
R
at
e
T
ot
al
M
-P
az
M
-P
az
M
-P
ai
sa
M
-P
ai
sa
C
as
h
B
an
k
L
oa
n
s
or
G
en
er
al
F
o
o
d
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
S
av
in
gs
T
ra
n
sf
er
s
E
x
p
E
x
p
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(A
d
m
in
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(A
d
m
in
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(S
u
rv
ey
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
β
1:
D
ef
au
lt
O
u
t
x
25
%
M
at
ch
x
P
os
t
-1
12
1.
78
64
5.
62
41
2.
12
-3
11
1.
20
-1
53
4.
95
44
1.
22
-4
54
.0
8
-2
78
.9
2
-1
71
9.
55
71
1.
80
(2
96
6.
74
)
(2
00
.7
5)
(1
32
.3
4)
(4
20
0.
67
)
(1
33
7.
80
)
(1
25
7.
00
)
(2
28
0.
89
)
(1
21
9.
56
)
(3
28
2.
98
)
(7
73
.5
3)
β
2:
D
ef
au
lt
O
u
t
x
50
%
M
at
ch
x
P
os
t
42
21
.0
0
17
03
.1
3
15
90
.3
7
-2
39
0.
95
29
8.
82
90
7.
55
-3
23
.0
4
53
8.
51
-2
99
5.
64
45
7.
94
(2
96
8.
33
)
(2
86
.0
7)
(2
23
.6
8)
(2
91
3.
31
)
(1
46
0.
17
)
(1
20
1.
55
)
(2
13
9.
07
)
(1
02
8.
32
)
(4
58
0.
51
)
(8
33
.7
4)
β
3:
D
ef
au
lt
In
x
0%
M
at
ch
x
P
os
t
20
41
.3
3
32
3.
80
51
3.
04
-3
05
6.
22
22
4.
44
-1
26
7.
55
14
4.
73
79
2.
69
-5
62
3.
64
62
5.
80
(3
80
9.
67
)
(1
93
.4
6)
(1
79
.8
7)
(4
33
9.
40
)
(1
07
4.
73
)
(1
43
5.
44
)
(2
77
0.
91
)
(1
16
7.
02
)
(6
27
3.
38
)
(8
26
.0
3)
β
4:
D
ef
au
lt
In
x
25
%
M
at
ch
x
P
os
t
35
85
.3
5
13
58
.9
7
13
37
.3
4
74
.6
1
19
25
.0
6
35
5.
62
-9
15
.6
7
12
3.
63
-9
81
.0
1
68
6.
30
(3
04
7.
85
)
(2
35
.8
3)
(2
26
.4
9)
(2
93
5.
55
)
(1
20
7.
62
)
(1
26
3.
08
)
(2
25
0.
46
)
(1
16
8.
60
)
(4
08
8.
32
)
(8
28
.9
9)
β
5:
D
ef
au
lt
In
x
50
%
M
at
ch
x
P
os
t
38
04
.4
6
19
31
.9
7
16
45
.5
3
15
37
.3
7
24
3.
51
-6
17
.2
7
51
0.
61
83
3.
56
-7
65
6.
92
95
1.
27
(3
14
6.
93
)
(2
94
.9
9)
(2
44
.4
6)
(3
47
9.
64
)
(1
23
3.
53
)
(1
40
4.
96
)
(2
22
4.
97
)
(9
35
.9
9)
(4
20
2.
88
)
(7
70
.2
8)
C
on
tr
ol
M
ea
n
85
08
.8
9
65
9.
33
57
7.
36
-1
44
7.
47
23
90
.0
2
21
63
.1
3
16
80
.6
9
84
3.
23
16
56
7.
11
36
29
.3
6
#
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
47
0
47
0
47
0
46
8
47
0
47
0
47
0
47
0
46
9
47
0
#
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
19
51
19
57
19
57
19
37
19
58
19
56
19
52
19
55
15
78
15
36
D
ef
au
lt
E
ff
ec
t
A
t
0%
M
at
ch
:
β
3
=
0
0.
59
2
0.
09
5
0.
00
5
0.
48
2
0.
83
5
0.
37
8
0.
95
8
0.
49
7
0.
37
0
0.
44
9
D
ef
au
lt
E
ff
ec
t
A
t
25
%
M
at
ch
:
β
1
=
β
4
0.
07
9
0.
02
0
0.
00
0
0.
46
1
0.
01
0
0.
94
5
0.
74
3
0.
74
8
0.
83
4
0.
97
2
D
ef
au
lt
E
ff
ec
t
A
t
50
%
M
at
ch
:
β
2
=
β
5
0.
88
1
0.
57
4
0.
86
7
0.
27
3
0.
97
0
0.
25
0
0.
45
6
0.
71
5
0.
33
8
0.
49
5
R
-S
q
u
ar
ed
0.
02
0
0.
11
1
0.
17
2
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
02
5
0.
00
7
0.
01
8
0.
02
5
0.
02
3
W
av
es
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
5
1
-
4
1
-
4
T
ri
m
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
W
av
e
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
N
o
te
s:
S
ee
T
ab
le
A
7
n
ot
es
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
em
p
lo
y
ee
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
su
rv
ey
w
av
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
a
“P
os
t”
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
eq
u
al
s
o
n
e
fo
r
al
l
w
av
es
a
ft
er
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e.
A
ll
va
ri
a
b
le
s
ar
e
tr
im
m
ed
at
1%
.
R
ob
u
st
st
a
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
em
p
lo
ye
e
le
ve
l,
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
69
Table A10: Long Term Effect of Defaults on M-Paz Balances by Quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = M-Pazandaz Monthly Participation (=1)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q1 (During Study) 0.440 0.495 0.472 0.346
(0.028) (0.039) (0.048) (0.046)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q2 (During Study) 0.330 0.366 0.374 0.234
(0.031) (0.045) (0.053) (0.050)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q3 (Post Study) 0.077 0.114 0.047 0.064
(0.035) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q4 (Post Study) 0.076 0.108 0.063 0.052
(0.038) (0.065) (0.064) (0.068)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q1 (Post Study) 0.083 0.098 0.088 0.062
(0.039) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q2 (Post Study) 0.075 0.099 0.084 0.040
(0.039) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q3 (Post Study) 0.070 0.105 0.072 0.031
(0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.072)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q4 (Post Study) 0.049 0.066 0.055 0.027
(0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.071)
Employer Match Complete 0% 25% 50%
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Employee FE YES YES YES YES
# Employees 943 318 315 310
# Observations 15932 5297 5436 5199
R-Squared 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11
Panel B. Dependent Variable = M-Pazandaz Monthly Balance (AFs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q1 (During Study) 1276.151 1451.145 1232.411 1149.819
(243.711) (266.035) (426.033) (497.305)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q2 (During Study) 2181.255 2328.027 2548.884 1676.520
(619.173) (558.224) (1103.583) (1289.838)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q3 (Post Study) 1101.753 437.328 1910.186 854.693
(424.186) (319.477) (884.962) (830.137)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q4 (Post Study) 937.288 62.507 2298.533 251.866
(508.617) (770.410) (883.006) (963.910)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q1 (Post Study) 291.542 -101.046 481.555 437.174
(542.742) (875.935) (801.500) (1129.017)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q2 (Post Study) 214.531 733.462 -103.568 1.781
(569.544) (1043.831) (909.243) (1035.179)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q3 (Post Study) 216.215 1122.238 -57.349 -427.992
(577.237) (1173.663) (905.239) (941.989)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q4 (Post Study) 689.448 1390.079 662.317 9.217
(660.593) (1254.212) (1112.137) (1078.826)
Employer Match Complete 0% 25% 50%
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Employee FE YES YES YES YES
# Employees 949 319 316 314
# Observations 17051 5672 5805 5574
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel is the monthly participation decision to contribute to the M-Pasandaz
account, and in the bottom panel is the M-Pasandaz balance at the end of each month (in Afghanis, or AFs).
Each observation is a respondent-month. All regressions include employee fixed effects and month fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered at employee level, reported in parentheses.
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Table A11: The Default Effect on Savings Behaviors and Attitudes, by Match Rate
Outcome: Control Default Naive List et al Bonferonni
Mean Effect p-Value p-Value p-Value
Panel A: Composite Indices (0% Match)
Importance of Saving Index -0.143 0.259 0.003 0.006 0.007
Financial Security Index -0.007 0.118 0.080 0.147 0.235
Well-Being Index 0.091 0.021 0.727 0.732 1
Panel B: Composite Indices (25% Match)
Importance of Saving Index 0.056 0.003 0.966 0.966 1
Financial Security Index -0.002 0.110 0.120 0.297 0.347
Well-Being Index -0.018 0.038 0.557 0.801 1
Panel C: Composite Indices (50% Match)
Importance of Saving Index 0.071 0.147 0.044 0.103 0.112
Financial Security Index 0.022 0.091 0.190 0.332 0.566
Well-Being Index -0.032 0.004 0.949 0.946 1
Notes: See Table 3 notes.
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Table A14: Present Bias and Contribution Changes (Unincentivized Baseline Measure)
Dependent Variable: Still at Default on February 28 Still at Default and
No Withdrawal on Feb. 28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias Parameter (β) -0.510 -0.460 -0.457 -0.407
(0.161) (0.170) (0.169) (0.179)
Long Run Discount Factor (δ) -0.147 -0.146
(0.288) (0.294)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) -0.051 -0.049
(0.023) (0.022)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Salary (1000 Afs) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) -0.013 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Male (=1) 0.025 0.033
(0.052) (0.052)
Education Level -0.001 -0.007
(0.017) (0.017)
Uses a Bank Account (=1) -0.041 -0.045
(0.037) (0.038)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday (=1) 0.008 0.006
(0.037) (0.037)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.051 0.039
(0.035) (0.036)
Constant 1.075 1.210 0.977 1.120
(0.156) (0.309) (0.164) (0.319)
R-Squared 0.010 0.025 0.008 0.020
# Employees 829 804 829 804
Notes: This table reports on the variables that predict whether a participant remains at their default election on February 28,
2015, two months after the start of the experiment. β is a measure of present bias obtained using a hypothetical price list at
baseline. The remaining variables are described in Appendix D.2. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
74
Table A15: Present Bias and Contribution Changes - Heterogeneity by Default Assignment
Dependent Variable: Still at Default on February 28 Still at Default and
No Withdrawal on Feb. 28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias Parameter (β) -0.143 -0.163 -0.143 -0.163
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Default In x β -0.003 0.037 0.094 0.132
(0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102)
Defaulted In (=1) -0.263 -0.057 -0.454 -0.234
(0.109) (0.243) (0.109) (0.242)
Default In x δ 0.035 0.043
(0.106) (0.111)
Long Run Discount Factor (δ) -0.004 -0.004
(0.072) (0.072)
Default In x Cognitive Reflection Test 0.009 -0.001
(0.050) (0.046)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) -0.050 -0.050
(0.034) (0.034)
Default In x Risk Preference 0.025 0.028
(0.012) (0.011)
Risk Preference (1-10) -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Default In x Salary 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Salary (1000 Afs) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Default In x Tenure at Roshan -0.015 -0.008
(0.014) (0.013)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) -0.004 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009)
Default In x Male -0.127 -0.142
(0.110) (0.109)
Male (=1) 0.095 0.095
(0.080) (0.080)
Default In x Education Level -0.047 -0.053
(0.035) (0.034)
Education Level 0.022 0.022
(0.024) (0.024)
Default In x Uses a Bank Account 0.002 0.007
(0.079) (0.079)
Uses a Bank Account (=1) -0.036 -0.036
(0.053) (0.053)
Default In x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.084 -0.064
(0.077) (0.076)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday (=1) 0.072 0.072
(0.052) (0.052)
Default In x Capable of Fixing Phone 0.061 0.003
(0.075) (0.074)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.030 0.030
(0.051) (0.051)
Constant 0.870 0.738 0.870 0.738
(0.068) (0.165) (0.068) (0.165)
Control Mean 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
# Employees 702 678 702 678
R-Squared 0.082 0.121 0.135 0.169
Notes: See Table 5 notes. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A16: The Default Effect: Additional Heterogeneity
Participates (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Default In (=1) 0.413 0.365 0.495 0.439 0.448 0.410 0.435 0.399 0.416 0.392 0.413 0.372 0.565
(0.034) (0.046) (0.076) (0.043) (0.063) (0.050) (0.072) (0.088) (0.135) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.213)
Default In x Present Biased 0.117 0.095
(0.069) (0.074)
Default In x Impatient -0.099 -0.107
(0.085) (0.089)
Default In x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.049 -0.037
(0.045) (0.050)
Default In x Risk Preference -0.007 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
Default In x Salary 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Default In x Tenure at Roshan -0.004 -0.009
(0.011) (0.013)
Default In x Male 0.013 -0.045
(0.096) (0.102)
Default In x Education Level 0.000 -0.016
(0.027) (0.032)
Default In x Uses a Bank Account 0.048 0.020
(0.070) (0.075)
Default In x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.002 0.027
(0.070) (0.074)
Default In x Capable of Fixing Phone 0.092 0.119
(0.069) (0.072)
Present Biased (=1) -0.083 -0.085
(0.048) (0.049)
Impatient (=1) 0.021 -0.009
(0.057) (0.059)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) 0.052 0.052
(0.032) (0.034)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Salary 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
Male (=1) -0.106 -0.087
(0.074) (0.079)
Education Level -0.017 -0.024
(0.019) (0.024)
Uses a Bank Account 0.014 0.036
(0.049) (0.054)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.036 -0.058
(0.048) (0.052)
Capable of Fixing Phone -0.016 -0.033
(0.048) (0.050)
Constant 0.276 0.310 0.260 0.248 0.259 0.263 0.258 0.367 0.352 0.271 0.291 0.284 0.480
(0.024) (0.032) (0.050) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038) (0.050) (0.069) (0.094) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.151)
# Observations 702 702 702 693 701 702 689 702 701 702 702 702 678
R-Squared 0.171 0.175 0.173 0.173 0.171 0.172 0.169 0.176 0.174 0.173 0.172 0.174 0.197
Notes: Participates (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and reflect values observed as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to
the rollout of phone surveys or secondary interventions. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an experimental present bias elicitation
completed at endline with real stakes and Impatient (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having δ < 1 (see paper text for details). The additional covariates are: cognitive
reflection task, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone – see Appendix D.2 for questions.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A17: Which Element of the Consultation is Associated with Switching: Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After February 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Assigned Consultation
Assigned Consultation (=1) 0.091 -0.006 0.061 0.039
(0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.034)
Assigned Consultation x Still at Default 0.165 0.031
(0.027) (0.040)
Assigned Consultation x Defaulted In 0.060 -0.068
(0.031) (0.034)
Assigned Consultation x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.298
(0.062)
Constant 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
R-squared 0.027 0.071 0.033 0.123
# Employees 927 927 927 927
Panel B: Accepted Consultation
Accepted Consultation (=1) 0.154 0.028 0.124 0.079
(0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.043)
Accepted Consultation x Still at Default 0.214 0.066
(0.036) (0.054)
Accepted Consultation x Defaulted In 0.060 -0.084
(0.042) (0.043)
Accepted Consultation x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.312
(0.078)
Constant 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
R-squared 0.040 0.112 0.046 0.165
# Employees 443 443 443 443
Panel C: Calculation Assistance
Calculation Assistance (=1) 0.439 0.143 0.362 0.193
(0.054) (0.071) (0.069) (0.095)
Calculation Assistance x Still at Default 0.447 0.277
(0.092) (0.128)
Calculation Assistance x Defaulted In 0.178 -0.147
(0.102) (0.128)
Calculation Assistance x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.399
(0.174)
Constant 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
R-squared 0.278 0.373 0.294 0.398
# Employees 295 295 295 295
Notes: See Table 6 notes. This table reports which elements of the financial consultation predict whether an
employee switches their contribution. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A18: Consultation Offer and Present Bias (Unincentivized Baseline Measure)
Accepted Consultation (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consult Later 0.063 0.067 0.064 0.042 0.395
(0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.064) (0.251)
Present Biased (=1) -0.048 -0.051 -0.058
(0.074) (0.076) (0.077)
Consult Later x Present Biased 0.018 -0.002 0.015
(0.100) (0.101) (0.103)
Impatient (=1) 0.009 0.008
(0.070) (0.071)
Consult Later x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.022
(0.058)
Consult Later x Risk Preference 0.001
(0.016)
Consult Later x Salary -0.003
(0.002)
Consult Later x Tenure at Roshan -0.004
(0.017)
Consult Later x Male -0.214
(0.148)
Consult Later x Education Level -0.014
(0.042)
Consult Later x Uses a Bank Account 0.094
(0.096)
Consult Later x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.042
(0.096)
Consult Later x Capable of Fixing Phone -0.005
(0.097)
Constant 0.716 0.820 0.829 0.827 0.631
(0.032) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122) (0.174)
Control Mean 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 380 380 380 380 380
R-Squared 0.005 0.036 0.038 0.041 0.063
Notes: Accepted Consultation Offer (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the employee agreed to participation in
a financial consultation regarding their participation in the M-Pasandaz program (see paper text for details). Consult
Later (=1) is a binary variable that equals zero if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a consultation on the
same day as the consultation offer was made, and equals one if the consultation was assigned to take place one week later.
Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an unincentivized
present bias elicitation completed at baseline and Impatient (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is
identified as having δ < 1 (see paper text for details). Columns (2), (4) and (5) include covariates for cognitive reflection
task, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on
payday, and capable of fixing a phone – see Appendix D.2 for questions. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A19: Which Treatments Move Participants From Their Default Contribution?
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After Feb. 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Consultation (=1) 0.097 0.033 0.066
(0.020) (0.013) (0.033)
Financial Consultation x Still at Default 0.109
(0.034)
Financial Consultation x Defaulted In 0.195
(0.068)
SMS Reminder (=1) 0.014 0.011 -0.002
(0.019) (0.011) (0.030)
SMS x Still at Default 0.006
(0.032)
SMS x Defaulted In 0.060
(0.070)
Still at Default (=1) 0.053
(0.020)
Defaulted In (=1) 0.037
(0.043)
Constant 0.032 0.000 0.038
(0.012) (0.000) (0.022)
R-squared 0.026 0.073 0.103
# Employees 888 888 526
Sample Full Full Still
at Default
Notes: This table reports the comparative effectiveness of different treatments designed
to move participants from their default election. SMS Reminder is a dummy variable
equal to one for participants receiving an SMS reminder message, Consultation is dummy
equal to one for subjects receiving an offer of a financial consultation, Still at Default is
a dummy variable equal to one for participants who have not moved from their default
election, and β is a measure of present-bias obtained from a hypothetical price list
experiment at baseline. N of 888 employees reflects attrition before the end of the study
on July 31st; results available on request confirm no differential attrition by assignment
to Consultation or SMS treatment. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table B1: The Default Effect on Total Contributions (incl. strata fixed effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = Participates (non-zero contribution rate)
Default In (=1) 0.41 0.47 0.45 0.30
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.24 -0.01 0.22 0.52
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 935 315 311 309
R-Squared 0.193 0.377 0.280 0.246
Panel B. Dependent Variable = Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
Default In (=1) 1.80 2.39 2.33 0.64
(0.26) (0.22) (0.47) (0.47)
Constant 2.33 -0.06 1.94 5.25
(0.37) (0.26) (0.63) (0.76)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 935 315 311 309
R-Squared 0.091 0.369 0.194 0.164
Panel C. Dependent Variable = Total M-Pasandaz Contributions (Afs)
Default In (=1) 2578.78 2230.65 3291.81 2377.44
(707.45) (662.61) (1299.58) (1368.33)
Constant 790.86 -542.47 313.46 2558.15
(454.77) (392.81) (819.92) (910.81)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 948 319 315 314
R-Squared 0.168 0.118 0.236 0.332
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel, Participates (=1), is a binary variable that
equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and dependent variable in middle
panel, Contribution Rate (% of Salary), is the monthy contribution rate into M-Pasandaz
as a percent of total salary. Participates and Contribution Rate reflect values observed
as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone
surveys or secondary interventions. Dependent variable in third panel is total contributions
made by the employee to M-Pasandaz, in Afghanis, as observed in administrative data.
Value reflects total contributions net of withdrawals as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the
disbursement of matching incentives. Value does not include matching contributions made
by the employer. Stratum fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses.
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Table B2: The Default Effect on Active Decision at Trial End (incl. strata fixed effects)
Continued M-Pasandaz After Program (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.10
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.34 0.20 0.38 0.45
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 810 272 276 262
R-Squared 0.081 0.110 0.136 0.103
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the employee
made an active decision to continued contributing to the M-Pasandaz after the 6
month study ended with no matching incentives offered. Stratum fixed effects are
included. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table B3: Which Element of the Consultation is Associated with Switching (incl. strata
fixed effects)?
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After February 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned Consultation (=1) 0.091
(0.018)
Accepted Consultation (=1) 0.157
(0.025)
Did Not Delay Consultation (=1) -0.098 -0.097
(0.260) (0.264)
Asked for Overview of M-Paz (=1) 0.050 0.072
(0.047) (0.052)
Initial Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.052 0.057
(0.050) (0.055)
Aware of M-Paz Plan and Rate (=1) -0.146 -0.166
(0.092) (0.106)
Asked to Repeat Projected Balance (=1) 0.128 0.124
(0.066) (0.071)
Calculation Assistance (=1) 0.394 0.408
(0.059) (0.060)
Additional Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.036 0.019
(0.059) (0.066)
Control Mean 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.16
Covariates NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.036 0.057 0.347 0.365
# Employees 927 443 295 287
Notes: This table reports which elements of the financial consultation predict whether an
employee switches their contribution. 469 of the 928 employees still active in our study at the
time of this intervention were assigned to be offered a consultation, establishing the sample for
column (1). Of these, 443 employees answered the call making the initial offer, establishing the
sample for column (2). Of these 443, 327 employees agreed to a full consultation. Accepted
Consultation is a dummy variable equal to 1 for these employees. Of the 327 employees who
accepted the consultation, 295 were reached by the second caller offering the consultation,
forming the sample for column (3). Of the 295 employees who both accepted and who were
reached for a consultation, all completed the consultation. 291 were able to talk immediately
(Did Not Delay Consultation=1), while 4 could not and were reached later. 259 requested
an overview of the M-Pasandaz product (Asked for Overview of M-Paz=1), while 36 did not.
91 employees had initial questions about the M-Pasandaz product (Initial Questions about M-
Paz=1), while 204 did not. 285 confirmed that they were aware of their plan and contribution
rate (Aware of M-Paz Plan and Rate=1), while 10 were not. All were informed of their projected
balance after six months including any potential bonus payments, and 52 employees asked
for this information to be repeated (Asked to Repeat Projected Balance=1), while 242 did
not. All were offered assistance with calculating how much money they would earn in different
contribution scenarios, 95 requested assistance (Calculation Assistance=1), while 200 did not.
Requesting assistance was not required to change the level of contribution to M-Pasandaz during
the consultation call. 53 employees had additional questions about the M-Pasandaz product
(Additional Questions about M-Paz=1), while 242 did not. Sample size in column 1 includes
full sample subject to attrition when consultation was offered, column 2 sample includes all
employees assigned a consultation, column 3 sample includes all employees who accepted a
consultation, and column 4 excludes employees missing covariates. The additional covariates
are: cognitive reflection test, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level,
uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone. Stratum
fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table B4: Consultation Offer Results By Present Bias (incl. strata fixed effects)
Accepted Consultation (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consult Later 0.078 0.079 -0.012 0.026 0.458
(0.049) (0.049) (0.067) (0.133) (0.274)
Present Biased (=1) 0.053 -0.050 -0.047 -0.008
(0.048) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071)
Consult Later x Present Biased 0.218 0.211 0.162
(0.097) (0.097) (0.099)
Impatient (=1) 0.022 0.051
(0.098) (0.099)
Consult Later x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.048
(0.070)
Consult Later x Risk Preference -0.012
(0.018)
Consult Later x Salary -0.004
(0.002)
Consult Later x Tenure at Roshan 0.005
(0.017)
Consult Later x Male -0.108
(0.156)
Consult Later x Education Level -0.015
(0.040)
Consult Later x Uses a Bank Account 0.087
(0.104)
Consult Later x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.160
(0.098)
Consult Later x Capable of Fixing Phone -0.051
(0.106)
Constant 0.768 0.785 0.839 0.818 0.595
(0.150) (0.149) (0.154) (0.186) (0.237)
Control Mean 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 329 329 329 329 329
R-Squared 0.069 0.066 0.084 0.084 0.121
Notes: Accepted Consultation Offer (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the employee agreed to participation in
a financial consultation regarding their participation in the M-Pasandaz program (see paper text for details). Consult
Later (=1) is a binary variable that equals zero if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a consultation on
the same day as the consultation offer was made, and equals one if the consultation was assigned to take place one
week later. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an
experimental present bias elicitation completed at endline with real stakes and Impatient (=1) is a binary variable that
equals one if an employee is identified as having δ < 1 (see paper text for details). Columns (2), (4) and (5) include
covariates for cognitive reflection task, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank
account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone – see Appendix D.2 for questions. Stratum
fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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D Experimental Scripts
D.1 Financial Consultation
Hello XXX. I am calling on behalf of the M-Pasandaz research team department. I am calling
because you recently requested that a representative call you to provide you with additional
information about M-Pasandaz, and determine how to use M-Pasandaz in the way that is
best for you. This consultation will last roughly 5-10 minutes. Are you able to speak to me
now? [RECORD RESPONSE]
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. As you know, M-Pasandaz is a new
benefit that is being offered to Roshan employees. In this call, you will have the opportunity
to ask questions about M-Pasandaz. I will provide information about how much savings you
would have for different levels of monthly contribution. At the end of the call, you will also
have the opportunity to change the level of your contribution if you would like.
First of all, would you like me to give you a brief overview of the M-Pasandaz account?
[YES/NO]
If YES: M-Pasandaz is a new benefit for all Roshan employees that was designed to help
increase your savings. It is a mobile savings account that is linked to your M-Paisa account. A
portion of your monthly salary - up to a maximum of 10% - can be automatically deposited
into your M-Pasandaz account each month. Participating in the M-Pasandaz account is
voluntary and you may receive benefits from Roshan to encourage you to save for the future.
You can access the money in your M-Pasandaz account at any time, but if you contribute
and dont make any withdrawals for 6 months, you may be eligible for a bonus from Roshan
as a reward for savings.
To begin, we would like to ask if there are any questions we might answer about M-
Pasandaz. [YES/NO]
Now, since every person has a different situation, I would like to explain several different
scenarios, to help you understand how different levels of M-Pasandaz contributions would
work for you. According to our records, you are in the [WHITE/BLUE/RED] plan, and you
currently have a monthly contribution rate of [XX%]. Were you aware that this was your
plan and contribution rate? [YES/NO]
According to our records, you have a monthly salary of XXX. Since you are in the
[WHITE/BLUE/RED] plan, you are eligible to receive a matching contribution Roshan of
[0/25/50] percent for all money that you save in your M-Pasandaz account. Our records also
show that you [HAVE/HAVE NOT] made a withdrawal from your M-Pasandaz account,
meaning that you [ARE NOT/ARE] still eligible to receive your matching contribution.
Therefore, if you continue to contribute at your current rate and make no withdrawals, at
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the end of the trial period in July, you would have a total value of MMM in your M-Pasandaz
account. This reflects both your contribution and the contribution of Roshan to the account
on your behalf. Would you like me to repeat this information for you? [YES/NO]
Thank you. Of course, you are always free to change your monthly contribution rate.
If you like, I can explain to you exactly what would happen if you decided to change your
match to a different amount. Would you like me assist you by explaining what would happen
if you changed your contribution rate to a different amount? [YES/NO]
If YES: What scenario would you like me to explain? The contribution rate can be
anywhere between 0% and 10% of your monthly salary. [RECORD ANSWER]
Do you have any additional questions about how M-Pasandaz works, or can I provide
any additional information that can help you determine how to use M-Pasandaz in the way
that is best for you? [YES/NO]
Thank you. Now, I would like to offer you the opportunity to change your contribu-
tion rate. If you wish, you can tell me your preferred rate, and I will change it for you.
Alternatively, you always have the opportunity to call HR at a later date and change the
contribution. Would you like me to change your contribution rate? [YES/NO]
If YES: What would you like your new rate to be: [RECORD RESPONSE]
Thank you very much for your time. Goodbye.
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D.2 Survey instrument (selected questions)
86
Endline survey questions (savings behavior, financial security, and wellbeing) 
 
Roshan leadership is reviewing the results of the M-Pasandaz pilot program, and will be making a 
decision in the next few months about its future. In the meantime, we would like to offer you the 
opportunity to continue to have a portion of your salary deposited automatically in the M-
Pasandaz account each month. For deposits made starting in August there will be no matching 
incentive paid, but you are welcome to continue to have part of your salary deducted and placed 
in savings if you find this useful. For these deposits, you will be free to make withdrawals at any 
time without penalty. 
 
 
 
Would you enroll now to have part of your salary deposited each month starting in 
August?  
1 Yes             98 Don’t Know           
2 No            99 Refuse to Answer         
  
  
 How important do you think savings is - extremely important, very important, somewhat 
important, not very important, not at all important? 
1 Extremely important     4 Not very important        
2 
Very 
important 
   5 Not at all important     
3 Somewhat important                         
 
 
 Do you attempt to save money each month? 
1 Yes           98 Don’t Know         
2 No                 98 Refuse to Answer       
 
 
 
If "1" means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and "10" means you are 
completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's 
financial situation? 
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-10, how satisfied are you personally with the financial situation of your 
household?  
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How confident do you feel that you will be able to meet your financial obligations (pay 
your bills, buy food/clothes) during the coming month: Highly confident, somewhat 
confident, Somewhat not confident, Not confident at all?  
1 
Highly 
confident 
      3 Some What not confident              
2 
Somewhat 
confident 
    4 Not confident at all       
 
 
 
How confident do you feel that you will be able to meet your financial obligations 1 year 
from now: Highly confident, somewhat confident, Somewhat not confident, Not confident at 
all?  
1 Highly confident  3 Some What not confident              
2 Somewhat confident 4 Not confident at all       
 
 
 Do you feel that you will be able to someday retire, stop working, and live off of your 
accumulated savings? 
1 Yes              2 No               
 
 
 What prevents you from saving? (not important, too many expenses, benefits are too small, 
no place to save, etc) 
1 Not important   3 Benefits too small 
2 Too many expenses     4 No place to save  
5 Other (Specify)  
 
 
 During the last seven days how many times did one or more people in your household not 
receive a regular daily meal? 
|___|___| Times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Taking all things together, do you think you are, Very happy, Somewhat happy, little 
happy or Not at all Happy: 
1 Very happy      3 little happy           
2 Somewhat happy   4 Not at all happy  
99 Refuse to Answer         
 
 
 All things considered, how satisfied are you with life as a whole? Please tell me your answer 
on a 10 point scale, where 1 represents Most Dissatisfied, 10 represents Most Satisfied." 
10 point scale: 10=Satisfied; 1=Dissatisfied  
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 All in all, how would you describe your state of physical health these days? Would you say 
it is…? 
1 Very good         4 Poor               
2 Good       98 Don’t Know    
3 Fair                                 
 
 
 Over the past 3 months were you unable to perform normal activities for at least 7 days due 
to an illness/injury? 
1 Yes              2 No              
 
 
 Has your participation in M-Pasandaz changed your desire to save? 
1 Yes             98 Don’t Know           
2 No               99 Refuse to Answer         
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Baseline survey questions (intelligence, risk, preferences) 
 
 
 If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how long does it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? 
|___|___| Min 
98 Don’t Know             99 Refuse to Answer             
                   
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
|___|___| Days 
98 Don’t Know             99 Refuse to Answer             
                   
 Suppose Ahmad earns a salary of 1000 dollars a month.  He obtains a ten percent raise this year 
and a ten percent raise next year.  How much exactly will his income be after the second raise? 
|___|___|___|___| 
98 
Don’t 
Know 
              99 Refuse to Answer             
 
 
There are many decisions we make in life that could lead to a range of outcomes.  For example, when we 
make a business investment, we are not sure that the business will be successful.  This phenomenon is 
called risk. Many decisions involve risk. For example, if you decide to sell a new type of product or service, 
how much profit will you earn? We are interested in understanding more about how business owners think 
about risk. 
 
 
How do you see yourself - are you in general a person who takes risk or do you try to avoid 
risks? Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0-10), where 0 represents "not at all 
prepared to take risk" and 10 represents extremely prepared to take risk. 
|___|___| 
 
     How many bank accounts do you personally do you have? |___| 
98 Don't Know             99 Refuse to Answer 
  
 If you had a technical problem with your cell phone, who would you mainly ask for help? (for 
example if your phone would not turn on or allow you to make calles) 
1 I can fix it myself       4 Cell phone retailer/repair shop   
2 A relative      
5 I would purchase a new phone 
3 A neighbor or friend     
6 Other (Specify)   
 
 
 
Do you withdraw your entire salary each month after you are paid, or do you leave a fraction 
on M-paisa? 
1 Withdraw entire monthly salary         
2 Leave some fraction on as an M-paisa balance 
 
 
D.3 Present Bias Elicitation
Below, we provide the survey instrument used to elicit the present bias parameter used in
the regression in Table 5. This instrument is a modified version of the time-dated price
list method proposed by Andreoni et al. (2015), where payments were made using M-Paisa
(mobile money). In our case, the incentivized measure leverages the fact that employees had
received their salaries using mobile money for several years, and therefore had a high degree
of confidence that they would receive their payments.
As noted in the text, however, this measure may be fungible to respondents (Cubitt
and Read, 2007; Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015;
Carvalho et al., 2014; Andreoni et al., 2016). In addition, we lack endline inconsistency
measures for 175 employees, or 18.4% of our sample. Of these, 131 (13.8% of sample) did
not complete an endline survey - primarily due to leaving Roshan before the end of the
experiment. The remaining 44 employees (4.6% of sample) completed endline surveys but
did not complete the inconsistency elicitation.
For this reason, we also separately estimate the regressions in Table 5 using a different
measure of present bias, elicited at baseline. In this protocol, subjects were asked: “Suppose
someone was going to pay you USD 450 in one month. He/she offers to pay you a lower
amount today. What amount today would make you just as happy as receiving USD 450 in
one month?” and “Suppose someone was going to pay you USD 450 in 13 months. He/she
offers to pay you a lower amount in 12 months time. What amount in 12 months would make
you just as happy as receiving USD 450 in 13 months?” We identify someone as present-
biased if the response to the first question is a lower amount than the response to the second
question.
Results using this measure of present bias are reported in Table A14, and are qualitatively
similar to those in the main text. All employees in our sample completed a baseline survey
but 53 employees (5.5% of sample) did not complete the baseline elicitation.
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Payment 
TODAY AFN 250 AFN 125 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY AFN 225 AFN 113 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY AFN 200 AFN 100 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY AFN 175 AFN 88 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY AFN 150 AFN 75 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
   2. Would 
you like to 
receive
   3. Would 
you like to 
receive
   4. Would 
you like to 
receive
   5. Would 
you like to 
receive
TODAY and 4 WEEKS from today
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 6?
For each decision number (1 to 5) below, decide the AMOUNTS you would like for sure today AND 
in 4 weeks by checking the corresponding box.
Example: In Decision 1, if you wanted AFN 250 today and AFN 0 in four weeks you would check the 
left-most box. Remember to check only one box per decision!
   1. Would 
you like to 
receive
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payment in 4 
WEEKS… AFN 250 AFN 125 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS… AFN 225 AFN 113 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS… AFN 200 AFN 100 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS… AFN 175 AFN 88 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS… AFN 150 AFN 75 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
   9. Would 
you like to 
receive
   10. Would 
you like to 
receive
4 WEEKS and  8 WEEKS from today
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 6?
For each decision number (6 to 10) below, decide the AMOUNTS you would like for sure in 4 weeks 
AND in 8 weeks by checking the corresponding box.
Example:  In Decision 6, if you wanted AFN 250 in four weeks and AFN 0 in eight weeks you would 
check the left-most box. Remember to check only one box per decision!
   6. Would 
you like to 
receive
   7. Would 
you like to 
receive
   8. Would 
you like to 
receive
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